From the UN pulpit

The Prime Minister's address to the UN General Assembly will have disappointed all those who expected to hear definitive statements on In...

The Prime Minister8217;s address to the UN General Assembly will have disappointed all those who expected to hear definitive statements on India8217;s post-Pokharan nuclear policy and in particular on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. What Atal Behari Vajpayee said in New York appeared to go no further than what has been said before in New Delhi and, indeed, in some respects fell short of what government spokespersons have stated earlier.

Without over-stressing the point, it is worth noting that the prime minister chose not to refer to his government8217;s nuclear doctrine in the terms used hitherto, that is, minimum credible deterrence, no-first-use and no threat of use against non-weapons states.

In the light of the dramatic change in policy that the May tests appeared to portend, such language implying restraint is what many would have expected to hear during the prime minister8217;s first appearance before the world community. By saying only that the tests had met India8217;s security needs, Vajpayee may have missed anopportunity to put at rest some of the doubts expressed about India8217;s programme.

There was no real reason not to put India8217;s cards on the table. Vajpayee8217;s justification for testing the nuclear environment and declarations about India8217;s undying commitment to nuclear disarmament would have carried much more conviction had he been more forthcoming on policy. As for the CTBT, his careful choice of words indicates that even though discussions between India8217;s special emissary Jaswant Singh and US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott have not progressed far enough, the government hopes to obtain US concessions before the September 1999 deadline for entry into force of the treaty.

There is no doubt the government is willing to accede to the CTBT. It was not sheer coincidence that the architect of India8217;s weapons and missile programmes, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, chose to reiterate his confidence in the data obtained from Pokharan-II a few days ago. This was intended to clear the way for a prime ministerialcommitment on signing the CTBT.

In the event, however, Vajpayee8217;s statement came with conditions attached to it. The general reading will be either that India is still sitting on the fence or is looking for a face-saving device. Such hedging undermines the assertion that India is willing to cooperate with the international community on non-proliferation.

Above all, if everything depends on cutting a deal with the US, it will make it doubly difficult for the government to persuade sceptics at home about the advantages of the CTBT or of participating in the fissile material cut-off negotiations. This is particularly so since the 8220;successful conclusion8221; of talks with Talbott is unlikely to be made public for obvious reasons.

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It is widely believed that the government is trying to get Washington to lift restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technologies, some of which will be of military significance. Whatever India manages to extract from the deal will not be publicised. Washington does not want to beseen to be rewarding India for going nuclear nor would the same 8220;incentives8221; necessarily go to Pakistan as it is demanding. So why advertise the deal-making from the roof-tops?