From Russia, with reactors

As Putin visits India, we must join Russia and US in globalising the nuclear industry

Russian President Vladimir Putin8217;s conditional commitment to sell four nuclear reactors to India is welcome for at least three reasons. One, it reinforces the sense of urgency in New Delhi to accelerate the negotiations with Washington and the international community on implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. Two, by highlighting the potential gains from the deal, Putin has, hopefully, helped lessen the paranoia that marked the recent Indian nuclear discourse. Above all, Putin8217;s initiative should encourage the Indian establishment to take advantage of the shared great power interests in promoting civilian uses of atomic energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Contrary to the fears in a section of the US establishment that Moscow is jumping the gun on nuclear cooperation with India and pre-empting Washington8217;s prospects for selling nuclear reactors to India, Putin8217;s offer is only an intention to cooperate. Its realisation depends entirely on the successful implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal. The joint statement on nuclear cooperation issued yesterday by Putin and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh states that the proposed expansion of cooperation will take place 8220;in accordance with their respective international commitments.8221; For Russia, those commitments will change only when the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group modifies its rules in favour of India.

Since Putin8217;s first visit to India in 2000, New Delhi and Moscow had been discussing the sale of additional nuclear reactors beyond the two which Russia was building at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. A few years back, Russia had signalled its inability to do so until the rules of the NSG were revised. France too embarked on a similar unsuccessful negotiation with India since President Jacques Chirac8217;s visit to New Delhi in 1998. Both Moscow and Paris had underlined the importance of getting the US on board to revise the global nuclear rules.

Contrary to the traditional Indian instinct to see the latest Russian offer as a counter to the US deal, Putin8217;s proposals merely complement the Bush initiative towards India. To be sure, there is vigorous competition between Russia, France and the US to get the lion8217;s share of the potentially large Indian nuclear market. But that dynamic, of great value for India, would come into play only when the Indo-US nuclear deal is approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NSG.

New Delhi has no reason to cut out the American reactor suppliers after the Bush administration did all the heavy political lifting. Nevertheless there is one apparent problem. Unlike Moscow and Paris, which are only bound by the NSG rules, Washington8217;s nuclear engagement with India is also defined by the domestic nuclear legislation on India, now called Hyde Act, which was approved by the US Congress last December. The reason behind President George Bush8217;s rejection of the many of the hortatory provisions of the Hyde Act, which caused so much of hand- wringing in New Delhi and Mumbai, was simple. Washington has no desire to put itself at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Moscow and Paris in the Indian nuclear sweepstakes.

After Putin8217;s nuclear offer to India, New Delhi and Washington have a strong incentive to quickly wrap up the bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. There are outstanding issues on India8217;s right to reprocess spent fuel, fuel supply assurances, and the termination of cooperation in the event of a future nuclear weapons test by New Delhi. Finding appropriate solutions should not be too difficult. It would also be a lot easier if India had taken a closer interest in the fast changing international debate on nuclear energy and non-proliferation.

The long isolation of the atomic energy establishment and the knee-jerk anti-Americanism on the left have blinded India to the extraordinary opportunities offered by the recent nuclear proposals from Washington and Moscow. For Bush and Putin, civilian nuclear cooperation with India is part of a larger framework they have outlined for non-proliferation. Bush called it the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership GNEP. Putin termed it Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure GNPI. These similar initiatives had four broad elements.

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One, the necessity for increased worldwide use of civilian nuclear energy to cope with the challenge of climate change. Two, the need to revive their own domestic nuclear industries. Three, the emphasis on providing reliable access to atomic reactors and fuel to all countries through international nuclear centres while preventing the spread of bomb-making technologies. Four, global cooperation in the development of safe and proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. The GNEP and GNPI aim to establish a new firewall between the imperative of expanded civilian nuclear energy use and the growing dangers of proliferation. Both offered answers to the challenges that have emerged in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

As it fought the old demons in its own mind, India turned its back on Bush8217;s GNEP and paid no attention to Putin8217;s GNPI. But, as Putin renews his call for establishing a network of international nuclear centres, India must look beyond its narrow obsessions. As a potential recipient of atomic fuel as well as a supplier of nuclear fuel cycle services, India is uniquely positioned to bridge the current gap in the global debate on nuclear supply assurances. India8217;s atomic energy programme was founded on international cooperation. The nuclear ideas of Bush and Putin offer a second wind to India8217;s nuclear power programme through renewed international cooperation, address India8217;s concerns on fuel supplies, allow New Delhi to host international nuclear centres, and open the door for India to take its rightful place at the heart of a globalising nuclear industry. A pragmatic India would grab this rare opportunity with both hands.