First casualty is democracy

The essential fact to recognise is that the first casualty of the BJP8217;s assertive nuclear policy is democracy. Nuclear politics anywhere in the world is conducted in great secrecy, works according to its own peculiar and closed logic and rapidly develops a momentum which takes it out of the hands of its players. As is evident in Pokharan, the whole national interest becomes hostage to objectives and methods defined and chosen by a small political-scientific-military coterie. Until now Indian leaders have understood this process well. For 50 years, from Pandit Nehru to Narasimha Rao to I.K. Gujral, the political leadership recognised that the nuclear path is inherentlyanti-democratic and wisely chose not to go down it despite provocations from the weapons powers, despite the goading of the domestic bomb lobby, despite the tempting Chanakyan scenarios of strategic analysts.

Now there is a prime minister, eloquent on most other matters, who has not so much as explained to a shocked nation why the tests are necessary, how national security is threatened at this juncture or what his vision of a nuclear India might be. There is only the fait accompli and the bald statement of facts followed by the silence of the graveyard except for the risible attempts of prime ministerial spokesman, Pramod Mahajan, to expatiate on official press handouts. The country cannot be expected to look ahead confidently when a sound national consensus on nuclear policy, built on a sturdy commitment to democracy, is overturned by a shaky and inexperienced coalition led by a party for whom national security has acquired the mythical aspects of the Ram Janmabhoomi and in whose political strategy theinternational community is fast occupying the position hitherto given to India8217;s minorities.

What has the BJP accomplished? If the objective was to provide nuclear scientists with data on the performance of a wide class of bombs, fission, thermonuclear and low-yield, it must be assumed, going by the test programmes of the five weapons powers until 1996, that the addition to knowledge is probably insufficient for purposes of complete scientific and military confidence. A further programme of tests will be necessary before fully reliable data are obtained for the new designs tested and certainly for a full-scale thermonuclear device if Indian policy-makers intend to acquire massive explosive force.

On the other hand, if the purpose was to demonstrate Indian scientific capabilities to a sceptical world, there was no need to conduct tests at all. International defence and intelligence communities, which are what really matter in nuclear deterrence, were well aware 8212; as the literature shows 8212; that India hasthe knowhow and material for miniaturisation and the development of a thermonuclear weapon. The doubters until May 11, and there were many who voiced their doubts loudly and often, came entirely from the domestic bomb lobby which includes some nuclear scientists, retired bureaucrats and foreign and strategic policy analysts in the capital. The bomb lobby, growing more demanding and confident whenever central governments appeared weak, came out in full cry during the CTBT debates in Geneva and regarded India8217;s refusal to sign the treaty as both high achievement and opportunity to push for acquiring the bomb. In the BJP, whose one-point nuclear policy is inherited from the Jan Sangh, the bomb lobby found the political compulsions which would enable it to realise its dreams.

The question one must ask in order to assess international reaction over the coming months is, what does the world read in Pokharan, the entry of a new member to the nuclear weapons club or something about the nature of political forcesbehind the nuclear blasts? One thing looks certain. The big powers will not help New Delhi to achieve the aims implicit in its offer of conditional adherence to the CTBT. Those aims are recognition of India8217;s nuclear status, disarmament commitments from the nuclear five so as to give New Delhi a moral leg to stand on, warding off harsh sanctions, and freezing Pakistan8217;s bomb programme at an early stage.

It is true that sustained economic sanctions will be difficult to impose given the differences in the Security Council, the fact that India has not made treaty commitments, and that its weapons capability is based on indigenous knowhow. Commercial competition between the industrial countries also makes a coherent sanctions regime next to impossible. But the US and others can do enough, by slowing down trade and investment, to compel the government to adopt open-door economic policies. If the economy does not pull out of its present slowdown quickly and shows signs of the East Asia disease, many in thestronger economies will be ready to benefit from falling asset prices.

But far more damage than the world can do just now will be done at home by nationalist drum-beating to drown out critics of government policy, to bring allies to order, and to quell popular protests over the totally unnecessary hardships brought upon the people.