
It does not seem probable that Pakistan will throw all caution to the winds and conduct another nuclear weapons test. There is nothing to gain and a great deal to lose from such a course of action at a time when international approval is an urgent economic and political necessity. The same was true, of course, two years ago but Nawaz Sharif still went ahead with Chagai.
So will prudence outweigh other factors when it comes to General Pervez Musharraf? Pakistani press reports of test preparations are not regarded in Washington as highly credible. Some US nuclear analysts appear to have corroborating evidence from satellite imagery of unusual activity around the site of Pakistan8217;s previous tests; others are sceptical. Washington has 8220;repeatedly and recently8221; received assurances that there is no intention to test.
However, perhaps because it cannot bank on Islamabad8217;s good sense or because it does not want to be caught napping again, Washington has chosen to warn Pakistan8217;s leaders of the 8220;serious consequences8221; of breaking the moratorium declared after underground explosions in May 1998, in particular, the risk to bilateral relations and the escalation of tensions in South Asia.
If Pakistan were thinking of testing, as some suggest, one last time before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it could be for two reasons, one technical, one political. Whatever the reason, it would be a gross misjudgement. Scientists independently monitoring the Chagai tests have concluded that they were not completely successful; they did not produce the yields Pakistan claimed. That would suggest more tests are essential to establish the reliability of its weapons.
However, it is foolhardy to assume one more round of tests will necessarily provide final confirmation of the safety and reliability of new weapons designs or provide sufficient data for further testing in the laboratory. Presumably, the plan is to deflect international opprobrium and economic sanctions by quickly signing the test ban. If such a plan exists, it is one last desperate throw of the dice, absurd and dangerous. No scientist worth his or her salt would endorse it.
As for political motivation, it is not unknown for military dictators to try and dazzle the crowd with a display of pyrotechnics. Musharraf is having a hard time. He is being severely criticised for everything from failing to intervene strongly in the drought situation in Sindh to allowing blackmarketeers to dictate tax laws.
The general is simply not proving to be the economic miracle-worker the country wants. In Pakistan, as in India, the belief that nuclear tests can build durable political fortunes has proved to be a colossal fallacy. Nawaz Sharif realised that soon enough. Should Musharraf be so unwise as to think another round of tests will divert the people from their mounting troubles, he is terribly mistaken. Sharif had the excuse, such as it was, of Pokharan.
Musharraf does not have that. He functions, moreover, in an international climate which, after Kargil and the blow to democracy, is far less forgiving of Pakistani leaders8217; adventurism. The economy is living on borrowed time; the patience of multilateral lenders is wearing thin. Pakistan needs firm and steady leadership, not risk-takers.