Ensure strategic autonomy

patience. Second, there is a marginal acceptance of India8217;s security

requirements in terms of nuclear and missile capacities. Third, India is showing an inclination to join the mainstream of the international

non-proliferation agenda, hoping that while doing so, it can still retain all its substantive options to maintain its security.

India has been engaged in bilateral discussions with important powers on the ramifications of its nuclear weaponisation since the end of December. There was a detailed discussion on non-proliferation issues and India8217;s defence requirements with Russian Prime Minister Primakov. This was followed by the discussions with a French technical team.Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra visited France and the UK. Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath simultaneously visited Japan, which was followed by the Strobe Talbott visit to New Delhi. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh is now in London for talks with the British Foreign Secretary. India is, therefore, engaged in substantive discussions with four out of five nuclear weapons powers to finetune its policies regarding the Comprehensive Teat Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty and other related issues.

It must be noted that there has been no meaningful exchange of views with China, which is the fifth nuclear weapons power. It would be pertinent to examine the substantive orientation of the policies of these countries on India8217;s nuclearisation.

First, the common points in their policies on the subject. None of them is willing to formally recognise India as a nuclear weapons power. There is a deliberate and measured refusal to acknowledge this reality, the objective being to containto the maximum extent possible India8217;s military and technological capacities. Second, all of them wish India to sign the NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT. Third, they all retain the objective of at least capping India8217;s nuclear and missile capacities.

China8217;s attitude is the most negative. Both officially and in public commentaries, the Chinese remain highly critical of India8217;s nuclear programme. Apart from insisting on India8217;s unconditional signing of the NPT and CTBT, China advocates the imposition of punitive sanctions on India. The Japanese are not as strident but remain critical of India8217;s nuclear weaponisation and consequent policies. During Foreign Secretary Rag-hunath8217;s discussions, the Japanese indicated that there is no likelihood of their diluting their economic sanctions against India unless India takes concrete steps to join the non-proliferation agenda of the nuclear weapons powers. While they welcomed India8217;s inclination to move towards non-proliferation arrangements under the CTBT, etc, they feltthat India should translate this inclination into concrete policy decisions.

The US and the UK remain committed to four pre-conditions to restore normalcy in relations with India and for the removal of sanctions, namely, adherence to the CTBT, agreeing to a moratorium on further production of fissile material, not developing or flight testing ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft and by further strengthening export controls on nuclear and fissile materials and technologies.

Regardless of the positive and constructive approach publicly articulated by US Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, the substance of US policies was spelt out by President Clinton in his State of the Union message on January 19 where he singled out India, North Korea and Pakistan, where the US would seek to restrain the spread of nuclear wea-pons and missiles. Tal-bott, while indicating a willingness to structure Indo-US relations in a context larger than non-proliferationconsiderations and indicating the willingness of the US to be responsive to India8217;s security concerns, has expressed the hope that in 1999, India would move back in the direction of being a part of the solution to the problems of non-proliferation. As far as one knows, there are no tangible indications of the US or the UK diluting or phasing out sanctions against India despite over-optimistic interpretations given to Talbott8217;s speech at Standford University just before he came for the latest round of talks in New Delhi.

Russia and France have, perhaps, adopted a more reasonable and practicable approach towards India. The discussions between Primakov and Vajpayee and the visit of Defence Minister George Fernandes to Paris have resulted in decisions to expand defence supplies cooperation between these two countries and India. Brajesh Mishra8217;s conversation with his French counterpart indicates that France is willing to evolve a flexible political and defence relationship with India to the maximum extentfeasible.

It is in this context that we have to assess the prospects of India8217;s recent diplomatic initiatives. The government makes two claims; first that India has not been isolated or ostracised, that it is interacting with major powers on this complex and sensitive issue. Second, that India can retain its policy options and strategic autonomy. Only time will tell whether breaking out of the initial isolation and having exchanges with the important powers will lead to removal of sanctions and India having normal multi-dimensional relations with these countries. Whether we will manage to sustain our strategic autonomy will depend on our policy decisions regarding our nuclear missile weaponisation. The indications are that India might sign the CTBT. India has declared a moratorium on further tests.

India has delayed further tests on the Agni the explanation is that the postponement is due to technical reasons and not political pressures, and India claims that its export controls are in line withinternational standards. Are these steps conducive to genuine strategic autonomy? How do we maintain a credible minimum deterrence which of necessity will have to be quantitatively and qualitatively flexible, depending on the evolving strategic and security environment around us, if we agree to make prior commitments about the quality and quantity of our deterrence capacities?

These questions require an answer consistent with our national security objectives because the Shakti tests were not just a technological demonstration exercise. They were a profoundly significant initiative to ensure our security.