Encounters with reality

Military force, which had been applied in wars that were conducted separate from civil society, is now required be used in conflicts within it. This mutation of military conflict has had a serious impact on the professional parameters that should guide military forces.

That the Indian military, despite its decades long active role in such operations has had a fine record in civil society is a matter of no small pride. The Indian military ethos is uniquely humanistic and value based. The evidence, unfortunately on the increase in indiscriminate and excessive use of its powers, is therefore a serious warning signal. What leads to the erosion of human and professional values in a disciplined force like the military is to be pondered over. The action of some officers and men, horrendous as they are, point to a deeper set of causes that destroy the honour based military culture.

The Indian armed forces are a performance-based system. Finite and measurable yardsticks measure success. Qualifications and theoretical excellence in themselves do not obtain promotion or recognition. Performance in peacetime is measured by efficiency in processes. Performance in operations, even of the Low Intensity kind, gets measured in the effectiveness with which objectives are attained. The military objectives set in the North East and in J038;K derive from the political directions received from the government. The governments in New Delhi, to their credit, have never set the objective of eliminating or destroying the armed dissidents, unless they resort to military action. The Indian military is thus required to create conditions by its operations, in which the militants can be brought to the negotiating table. The military obtains this limited objective time and again only to find that resolution of the conflict escapes the political executive. Such operations therefore carry on for decades.

In military operations continued in the midst of civil society over decades, how is military success to be measured? It has in the past distorted the military8217;s perspective of success. In Vietnam, at one stage, weapons recovered became a yardstick. At another time, the number of Vietcong killed became the measure. Such perverse ideas led to the military doctrine of weapons and body counts. Later, the number of encounters a battalion had became the yardstick. That in turn led to staged encounters and killings. It took decades for the Colin Powell generation to remake the US military after the regressions of Vietnam.

It has taken only a few years of the mistaken belief in military force, for that fine military to be bogged in Iraq. Now, a new generation of Generals is blaming the political masters for the Iraq imbroglio.

Distorted priorities and emphasis on body and weapons count is often linked with performance measures. In recent years, military units that perform well by such yardsticks are cited for excellence. In the Indian system, gallantry awards play a major part in the performance-based promotion system. Is such recognition now being earned from faked encounters? Even in Siachen, there has been a notorious case. At one time, it was enough to have served in Siachen and no further testimony was required for courage or fortitude. It would appear that things are changing towards the less worthy side of recognition and honour.

The reality of the Indian scene is that Low Intensity Operations will continue indefinitely. The Indian military will continue to be employed in such operations. Army Chiefs can continue to plead with the political executive to desist from using the army for such work. The Indian state is not yet ready to take the bold measures that will resolve the long-lasting internal conflicts. It must also be accepted that foreign involvement makes such bold measures difficult to initiate.

The way forward lies in a fresh inquiry into the state-making apparatus India has used. It has utilized language, federal structures, devolution of powers and social justice in a tolerant and democratic polity. This experiment in democratic social engineering has amazed the world. A false belief in the instrument of military force in the state-making enterprise therefore needs to be recast. That must remain the starting point of examining the question of military success and victory. Even recent history shows that military victory is no guarantor of peace. The spectacular victories by both sides in the Arab-Israeli Wars, victory declared after the military action in the wars in Iraq, or the defeat of the Taliban, have not led to success in obtaining the peace dividend.

When such military victories are sought or claimed in domestic conflicts, and are conducted in the midst of civil society, the extent of damage lasts longer. The damage to the professional code of the military is even greater.

The writer, a retired Lieutenant-General, is Director, Delhi Policy Group