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This is an archive article published on February 7, 2000

Don8217;t expect too much

FEBRUARY 6: President Clinton will be in India between March 20 and 25. Apparently, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's discussions ...

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FEBRUARY 6: President Clinton will be in India between March 20 and 25. Apparently, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh8217;s discussions with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in mid-January, sorted out the more immediate problems related to his visit. They perhaps also came to a general agreement on the terms of reference of discussion between Vajpayee and Clinton.

The delay in the announcement of firm dates, to some extent, reflected not just logistical considerations, but perhaps a certain political reluctance in certain segments of US establishment to endorse Clinton8217;s visit to India, without visiting Pakistan. It, however, now seems that unless Pakistan gives categorical assurance about withdrawing support from terrorist activities, signing the CTBT and a return to democracy within some defined time-frame, he may not visit Pakistan. This decision is not certain or final as yet.

The atmospherics of the visit stand negatively affected by Clinton8217;s public statement that he and his government didnot have sufficient evidence about Pakistan8217;s involvement in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane, in the last week of December. This statement is based on political calculations of the long-term US interests in Pakistan rather than on facts which the US itself has accepted and acted upon. The US State Department and its anti-terrorism office cooperated with the Indian government in investigating the hijack. Though Clinton8217;s statement and pronouncements of official US spokesmen are carefully worded, the public perception in India is that of the US letting General Musharraf and his intelligence agencies off the hook on an incident that agitated the Indian people greatly.

Reports about the likelihood of Clinton8217;s stopover in Pakistan perhaps in Karachi for a day or a day and a half has perturbed public opinion here. Then there are apparently contradictory messages on non-proliferation issues. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has said that the US is ready to accept the realities of India8217;snuclear weaponisation and is willing to deal with India, if it joins the mainstream of the world non-proliferation agenda. It has, however, also been asserted on Washington8217;s behalf that the objective of US policy remains to make India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear and missile weaponisation programmes.

While considering public expectations from this visit in both countries, we should be conscious that Clinton8217;s visit to India does not have the same significance in the American psyche as his visits to China, the Middle East or Moscow. The questions on which his visit would be judged by American public are: Has Bill resolved the problems between India and Pakistan, and brought peace in South Asia, as he did for Northern Ireland and is trying to do it in the Middle East? Has he persuaded the Indians and Pakistanis to abide by the US non-proliferation agenda? Has his visit resulted in a significant expansion of opportunities for American business in India?

The questions to affect the Indian publicopinion in contrast would be: Did Clinton lay the foundation of a strong Indo-US relationship, acknowledging India8217;s importance as a democracy and geo-strategic importance in the region? Did he show a willingness to accept the realities of India8217;s nuclear weaponisation and deal with India practically by lifting direct and indirect sanctions? Did he agree to generate pressure on Pakistan to desist from subversive activities against India and terrorism? Did he indicate that the deeper US commitment is to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan by keeping the minimum necessary distances from the Musharraf regime?

A Clinton visit to Pakistan will certainly affect public perceptions here. The importance of the visit to India will diminish, if he goes to Pakistan at this juncture. But, beyond a certain point, his visiting Pakistan need not give us high blood pressure for two reasons. First, the substance of Indo-US relations need not be linked to US interactions with Pakistan.

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Secondly, given the US trackrecord of dealing with Pakistani regimes over the last 50 years, Clinton8217;s trying to 8220;constructively engage8221; Musharraf is not unexpected. It would be unrealistic to expect Clinton to engineer a positive breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations in the immediate future. He could make suggestions to Vajpayee and Musharraf, which could provide options for resumption of a dialogue. India should give consideration to such suggestions within the framework of Indian interests. The US has been generating pressure on Pakistan on issues of cross-border terrorism and subversion. The US role in getting Pakistan to move back beyond the Line of Control in the Kargil conflict should not be underestimated.

The US would generate a calculated and measured rather than punitive pressure on Pakistan on these issues. We should not expect the US to certify Pakistan as a terrorist state. US remains interested in sustaining its leverages in Pakistan, due to political and strategic considerations.

The contradictions in US policyassertions reflect the important reality of the controversy between the non-proliferationists and realists in the US establishment. India is being considered as a test case by the US, to decide whether realism will work or a doctrinal commitment to US non-proliferation theology be more useful. If India signs the CTBT and proceeds to join FMCT negotiations, the realists would be considered winners. If not, US ideologues will become assertive. The point which these different schools of thought miss is that it is not their agenda or global strategic considerations, but India8217;s own security concerns and interests that will determine India8217;s decision on vital non-proliferation issues.

This should be so regardless of difficulties which India may face. The sensitivity which Clinton and his successors show in this regard, would be a major factor affecting the future of Indo-US relations.

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If India shows greater dynamism and purposiveness and the US shows greater patience and awareness of long-term prospects, theIndo-US economic and technological cooperation has undoubted prospects of expansion. There is an awareness in India about the necessity and desirability of a substantive and expanding relationship with the US. Reciprocation of this feeling may not be at the same level. This is inherent in the logic of inequalities between the two countries. This is another factor which we should not ignore but should not get emotional about. The attempt should be to achieve the maximum possible on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and respect for each other8217;s substantive interests.

President Clinton8217;s visit will be important, subject to these limitations and complexities. Indo-US relations at the deepest level should not depend only on presidential or prime ministerial visits, but on broad trends of convergence of interests which find expression when such visits take place.

 

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