Defeating ULFA146;s aims

Every Indian has reason to be grateful to Bhutan for the decisive way in which it had acted to expel anti-India insurgent outfits, which hav...

Every Indian has reason to be grateful to Bhutan for the decisive way in which it had acted to expel anti-India insurgent outfits, which have been operating from its soil. The flushing out operations of the Royal Bhutanese Army have led to great disarray in their ranks and have forced many misguided activists within them to rethink their politics and project of violence. The statement issued by the 78-year-old Bhimkanta Buragohain 8212; an important ideologue of the United Liberation Front of Assam ULFA who has been with the outfit since its inception in the late seventies 8212; calling upon ULFA members to eschew violence and begin peace negotiations with the Government of India, is a significant development.

Buragohain8217;s observations that results do not emerge from the barrel of a gun, taken along with Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi8217;s clever offer of amnesty for surrendering militants, should hopefully bring about a sea change in terms of terrorist activity in the region. Take ULFA8217;s most recent history, and the threat it posed to the stability of the Northeast becomes clear. In November alone, the ULFA, riding on the anti-Bihari backlash, was responsible for the killing of over 30 innocents, including the horrific gunning down of 11 Bihari kiln workers in Tinsukia district. The fact is that the ULFA has in its 25 years of existence spun a web of terror over the region by stealth, careful networking, smuggling in arms and drugs and through support from interested organisations like Pakistan8217;s ISI. In the mid-eighties it established links with Naga militants and Myanmarese insurgency groups for training and arms and it is well-known that the outfit has both training camps, businesses and safe havens in Bangladesh.

The recent expulsion from Bhutan is possibly the biggest reversal the ULFA has had to face and India must ensure that 2004 sees a consolidation of the process. This would require interventions on three fronts. At the external level, the Bhutan model of cracking down on insurgents should be replicated elsewhere, with countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar urged to take similar action for the greater common good of the region. Internally, a carrot-and-stick approach should yield results. While there must be no slackening of vigilance and follow-up action against the militants, those who are prepared to surrender must be provided opportunities for gainful occupation and assured protection for themselves and their families. When things stabilise, the Indian government could seriously consider engaging with groups like these so that lasting peace could be ushered into the area.