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Journalism of Courage
NEW DELHI, FEB 24: There was complete intelligence failure and the Pakistan Army8217;s intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a 8220;complete and total surprise8221; to the Indian Government, the Army and the intelligence agencies, the Subrahmanyam Committee has concluded.
The 228-page report titled 8220;From Surprise to Reckoning8221;, which was tabled in the Lok Sabha at 2.05 pm by Defence Minister George Fernandes amid noisy protests from the Opposition, has pinpointed the blame on the external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing RAW. However, even the Intelligence Bureau IB and Military Intelligence MI have not been spared. In fact, the Committee has recommended the setting up of an integrated defence intelligence system.
In a scathing indictment, the Committee says that 8220;the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence systems appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo8221; and despite the 1962 debacle, 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory and the nuclear threat, there has been little change in the national security management.
The committee also found 8220;inadequate coordination at the ground level8221; between the Army intelligence and the other agencies. This was also lacking in the Joint Intelligence Committee JIC because of a low level of representation by the Directorate General of Military Intelligence.
DGMI representatives were not coming fully briefed on the latest situation, the committee says. It says that the JIC did not get the importance it deserved, either by intelligence agencies or by the government.
The Committee found lack of inter-agency coordination as well as lack of coordination between the Army and the agencies. It found the intelligence structure flawed since there is little back up to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection.
The Committee says that the Pokharan nuclear tests had no bearing on the Kargil intrusions and, as expected, has exonerated the Army top brass of any culpability. The committee concludes that Lieutenant General Army Commander Northern Command H M Khanna8217;s visit to Pune when the crisis in Kargil had broken out was on account of 8220;advice8221; that he needed from his predecessor Lt Gen Padmanabhan in Pune.
The committee also concludes there was nothing wrong with General V P Malik visiting Poland even after the ammunition dump in Kargil exploded and the Army sought gunships to deal with the crisis. It concluded that the response of the Army was very rapid and strong. On the Lahore bus diplomacy, the Committee felt that deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was 8220;aware8221; of the military plans, even as he welcomed Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Lahore. The committee says that Kargil was both a military and diplomatic victory.
The committee concludes that the intrusions began taking place by end ofJanuary 1999. By February, Pakistan Army began setting up administrative camps, but the bulk of Pakistani troops came in April. The aerial survey by India was only to check infiltration and therefore, even the helicopters flew with that in mind, failing to check intrusion at peaks and ridgelines. The report also concludes that the Army lacked adequate warm clothing and light and modern weapons system for the soldiers.
