Caution, India8217;s watchword

I wrote in this column nearly a month ago about the danger signals from Sri Lanka since the LTTE's capture of the Elephant Pass and launch...

I wrote in this column nearly a month ago about the danger signals from Sri Lanka since the LTTE8217;s capture of the Elephant Pass and launch of a major offensive against the Sri Lankan forces. The situation has reached critical thresholds and has been described by President Chandrika Kumaratunga as the gravest threat faced by her country. Appeals have been made to the Indian Government from various segments of the Sri Lankan society to prevent a military debacle for Sri Lanka and revive some kind of negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government. Speculation on the trajectory which the crisis will take in the coming weeks should necessarily be preceded by recounting of the ground realities as they have evolved.

The LTTE is in control of most of the Jaffna peninsula now. They are barely 10 kilometers away from the main formations of the Sri Lankan army confined within the city limits of Jaffna and perhaps only in the Jaffna Fort and surrounding areas. The Sri Lankan forces are in control of the Palaley Air Base and Kakasenthurai Port, as this column is being written. Their morale is low and they seem to be exhausted by the long campaign of attrition to which the LTTE has subjected them over the last five years.

It should also be remembered that, while sustaining their campaign in the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE continued to confirm its capacity to undertake major violence in other parts of Sri Lanka from Trincomalee to Colombo, including a near-successful bomb attack on Kumaratunga last December. The overarching ground reality is of the LTTE being militarily and politically strong while the Sri Lankan Government appears to be on the defensive.

The question arises as to why the LTTE has launched its current campaign while only three months ago it had agreed to resume dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government through Norwegian mediation. The answer based on experience of the last decade or more is that the LTTE8217;s aim was to lull the Sri Lankan Government and the armed forces into a mood of military relaxation, while they themselves regrouped in a bid for significant military victories in order to negotiate from a position of strength. They appear to have succeeded in meeting this objective. The very segments of Sri Lankan politics, which refused to respond to Tamil aspirations despite several commitments given over the years and which demanded the abrupt departure of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, are now asking for India8217;s intervention.

The Buddhist monks, the then representatives of the former ruling UNP and even sections of the Sri Lankan armed forces now argue for Indian reinvolvement. Given India8217;s reluctance in this regard, they even advocate an Indian role in support of the Norwegian facilitating effort. New Delhi8217;s response so far has been measured and cautious, as it should be in the context of our experiences in Sri Lanka between 1978 and 1990. India has ruled out any military intervention and indicated a willingness to extend humanitarian assistance to the people of Jaffna and the Sri Lankan armed forces bottled up in the peninsula subject to a formal request being received from the Government of Sri Lanka and to certain logical conditions.

Informal suggestions asking for such assistance have been conveyed both through governmental and non-governmental channels from Sri Lanka. Though India has not spelt out details of the humanitarian assistance, its likely form is a large-scale supply of food and essential medicines to the people of Jaffna and help in evacuation of the Sri Lankan forces from Jaffna. The last week of May witnessed intense consultations in the Indian Cabinet Committee on National Security and in the Strategic Policy Group of the National Security Council. There have also been reports of the Eastern Naval Command of India being put on the alert for possible evacuation operations.

The Government of India has also been in touch with the representatives of the Norwegian and US governments apart from continuous communication with the Sri Lankan authorities to help resolve the critical military situation. Obviously, India8217;s assistance should be preceded by an effective ceasefire. A more important question is about the prospects of resumption of negotiations, if the immediate military confrontation ends. Will the LTTE be amenable to a ceasefire when it is on the ascendant? A pull-back of the Sri Lankan forces from Jaffna will enable the LTTE to consolidate its hold over the peninsula. The LTTE may then focus its attention on the eastern regions of Sri Lanka Trincomalee, Batticoloa and Amparai which the LTTE considers part of the traditional homeland of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

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Any negotiations for resolving the crisis and any involvement by India in the process, should be subject to the following considerations. It must be remembered that Prabhakaran and the LTTE have a passionate and deep ideological commitment to create a Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The military and political successes and survival which the LTTE has achieved would have made these commitments stronger. The Tamil demands of 1987 would be pitched higher this time. Conversely, the military conflict and reverses suffered by the Sri Lankan armed forces would have hardened Sinhalese attitudes about coming to any compromise with the Tamils.

Despite the LTTE8217;s authoritarian and violent culture, Sri Lankan Tamils in general support the LTTE. Whether this support is based on fear or voluntary endorsement of the LTTE is not relevant. The support exists. The Tamil diaspora living in different countries which supports the LTTE has a vested interest in continuing the conflict situation in Sri Lanka because the political uncertainties in Sri Lanka enables them to stay abroad in comfort, with the privileges of political asylum and a refugee status.

The Muslim population of Sri Lanka, though Tamil-speaking, claims a separate ethno-religious identity. They would have their own demands which they would want to be an integral part of any settlement package. Though the LTTE is banned in India, it maintains its connections in Tamil Nadu. The Tamil public opinion in India and the Tamil Nadu politics are bound to influence Indian policies towards Sri Lanka in proportion to the intensity of critical predicament the Tamil population in Sri Lanka may face, even if the present crisis is overcome. In the context of its own geo-political predicament, India has declared its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Adjusting the square of this commitment to the circle of the LTTE8217;s demand for Eelam is going to be a difficult task.

The nature and content of India8217;s involvement in Sri Lanka, however, cannot be predicted with any certainty. Vajpayee is, therefore, right in keeping Indian options open as when stating that India is prepared to cope with any eventuality in Sri Lanka by appropriate means.