Bofors and after

The government8217;s decision to enhance the delegated financial powers of the union defence minister on arms purchases 8212; from Rs 50 crore to Rs 100 crore 8212; would have sounded comical but for the sorry state of the acquisition process in his ministry. For an establishment that would soon spend a whopping Rs 100,000 crore of public money annually, the finances of the defence ministry, a substantial part of which goes into buying arms, is largely untouched by modern methods of management.

The latest move of the government is welcome; but it should be the first step of a long overdue reform of the defence acquisition process. The urgency of modernising the manner in which the nation buys arms stems from a number of factors. Not in the least because the Indian political classes have been hooked on to the habit of playing football with arms purchases. It does not matter which party is in power and who sits on the other side of the aisle. The constant questioning of defence deals for immediate gains, including political vendetta, has paralysed decision-making. While politics since the Bofors deal in the late 1980s has taken its toll on defence acquisition, the problem goes deeper. Last year a committee headed by the noted economist, Vijay Kelkar, had outlined a major reform agenda for the defence ministry that included the generation of better transparency and efficiency in the arms acquisition process, involvement of the private sector, off-set management, and defence exports.

India is one of the world8217;s biggest customers for advanced weapons and boasts an expansive, if somewhat ramshackle, infrastructure for arms research, development and production. Radical reform of the defence sector would not only allow India to leverage its defence spending for national gains across the board would also help bury the Bofors syndrome once and for all.