
IN the midst of growing enthusiasm over economic ties, there is quiet expectation that India and China will cross another milestone in the long road to a boundary solution. The milestone may be in the form of guiding principles that can set out political parameters for an agreement.
But the boundary question is extremely complicated. It will eventually require both sides to make territorial adjustments. Yet there is political will on both sides. To that extent an agreement on guiding principles will be a step forward.
When then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Beijing in 2003, both countries made important strides that eventually led to China changing Sikkim8217;s status on its maps, and recognising it as part of India.
Yet the more controversial aspects of the boundary question are still to be addressed. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was in Beijing for the 15th meeting of the joint working group JWG on the boundary dispute. The group met after nearly three years, on March 30-31. There was hope that maps on the Western sector would be exchanged.
But that did not happen. It was felt the exchange of maps would only broaden the scope of differences.
In short, the India-China boundary is divided into the Eastern, Western and Middle sectors. And the break up is somewhat like this:
Western sector: This comprises the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir and Xinjiang as well as the Tibet Autonomous Region. It has two sub-sectors, east and west of the Karakoram Pass. China has occupied 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir state and claims Demchok called Parigas by Beijing.
Further, 5,180 sq km in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir Shaksgam Valley is also with China, obtained through an agreement with Pakistan in 1963. India does not recognise the agreement and considers it illegal.
Middle sector: Comprises the boundary between Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal in India and Tibet Autonomous Region of China. China claims 2,000 sq km here in Giu and Kaurik, the Shipki pass, Nilang and Judang called Sang and Tsungsha by the Chinese. Beijing also claims Sangchamalla and Lapthal.
This is the only sector for which maps stating each other8217;s positions along the Line of Actual Control LoAC have been exchanged.
Eastern sector: This comprises the boundary between Arunachal Pradesh and China. Beijing disputes the legality of the McMahon Line here and claims 90,000 sq km in Arunachal Pradesh.
There is also a fourth segment called the Sikkim Sector, where India never had any dispute with China. With the latter now recognising Sikkim as part of India, the issue is over.
China contends there is no treaty that formally delineates the boundary and that the dispute is an outcome of British imperialistic aggression. India, for its part, believes that though the entire length of the boundary has not been formally delineated, it has been defined by treaty or recognised by custom.
The boundary, according to New Delhi, follows the geographical principle of watershed which, in most places, is the crest of the Himalayan mountains.
Further, there are specific international agreements, like the 1684 treaty between Ladakh and Tibet and the 1842 treaty between the Lahore Durbar and the Chinese in the Western sector.
The 1954 agreement on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet and the Indo-Tibetan Agreement of March 1914 in the Eastern sector are some of the other treaties cited by India.
DESPITE differences, China first brought up a package of solutions during Vajpayee8217;s visit in 1979, as foreign minister. This was indicated by Deng Xiaoping, who was then China8217;s vice-premier.
During then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi8217;s China visit in December 1988, both countries agreed to set up a JWG on the boundary question. This was followed by an agreement in 1993 to maintain peace and tranquility along the LoAC, which came into existence after the 1962 war.
Following Vajpayee8217;s visit of 2003, politically-empowered special representatives were appointed to explore the framework of a boundary settlement. Seniormost vice-minister in the Chinese foreign office Dai Bingguo and the India national security advisor Brajesh Mishra and then the late J.N. Dixit met four times, ending November 2004.
It is learnt the Cabinet Committee on Security during the NDA regime had cleared a set of guiding principles to be explored with the Chinese side. The principles take into account geography, historical legacy, legal issues, mutual security concerns.
India has been encouraged by recent statements from Wen Jiabao, which mention recognition of ground realities as a basis for finding a solution. This, sources say, augurs well for the special representatives8217; meeting that will be held today.