Be Ready for Collateral Damage

Three years ago, Musharraf had just taken over as Chief of the Army Staff, but had lost little time in developing his artistry in duplicity....

Three years ago, Musharraf had just taken over as Chief of the Army Staff, but had lost little time in developing his artistry in duplicity. While his PM was going through the motions of the Lahore Talks, Musharraf was well on to moving his Northern Area troops across the LoC on the Kargil Ridge. Pakistan had no pangs of guilt while disclaiming its own troops and labelling them 8220;Jehadis8221;. The spectre of duplicity continues today. There is total denial of the existence of any terrorist organisation, leave alone acceptance of the Jammu carnage and the Lone assassination. Obvious lesson:we can8217;t be taken in by Pakistan8217;s charades of innocence.

We would be hard put to recall the Pakistani 8216;8216;feeler8217;8217; thrust into Kutch in April-May 8216;65. But soon it will be the third anniversary of the launch of Operation Safed Sagar, the air campaign of Operation Vijay on the Kargil heights. At the start of the operations the demand for armed helicopter action was very strong. The IAF advice had always been consistent that armed helicopter action can never be in stand-alone mode; it had to be mashed in with fighter operations, and that too only if the air-situation is sufficiently benign.

As it happened our first two losses were fighters, due to ill fortune rather than superior enemy action. Young Flt Lt Nichiketa had had a spontaneous engine flame out. The munitions used were launched from outside their cleared operating envelope, causing engine surge and flame out. To reduce vulnerability to ground-fired missiles, mission orders were for a one-pass attack; but Nichiketa did a couple of extra passes as he had difficulty in timely acquisition of the target causing weapon aiming problems. This had resulted in the enemy ground-based air defences being fully activated. When Nichiketa ejected, Sqn Ldr Ahuja, who was in the follow up mission after Nichiketa8217;s, went down too low in his effort to locate Nichiketa, and himself fell victim to one of the enemy missiles.

For Op Safed Sagar, our air operations had been limited to our side of LoC. The nation has to be mentally prepared for crossing the LoC this time since it will be inevitable. Also, should we address terrorist camps/training areas embedded in military and civilian areas? Despite all precautions collateral damage is inevitable. It is important how we project this to our people and the rest of the world. The fault would be entirely that of those who allow terrorists to reside, train and operate from within their midst.

If wisdom prevails on the other side, our very intent to act pro-actively should dissuade it from harbouring and encouraging terrorists, and the present situation could be diffused. If not, we will have to act forcing wisdom to prevail, even though belatedly. Should the cussedness continue, the ante would have to be upped progressively. During Op Vijay the area of operation did not widen. Should there be hostilities under the present circumstances, our forces will have to have far greater freedom and flexibility of action.