Auditing coercive diplomacy

The weight of evidence indicates that diplomacy has always been given primacy over the use of force in India. This is not because of any faintheartedness in using force, but because diplomacy provides most solutions, and diplomacy backed by force is even more effective. The key here is to know the limits and strengths of diplomatic moves where the international community impacts on policy choices and that of military power.

And where military power is used, the diplomatic posture should be able to back the moves, a lesson Islamabad normally ignores because in their calculus, the use of force comes early. The second is that India has been notably successful in the employment of military force without going to war, at least so far.

Such coercive diplomacy had been resorted to in the past, but not at this scale and for this duration. In a remarkable reversal, its 18-year old strategy of 8216;low cost8217; option of bleeding India has begun to bleed Pakistan economically even if the Pakistani elite do not wish to acknowledge it.

At the current rate, and in spite of the bravado shown by General Musharraf, his defence expenditure would go up by as much as 30 per cent during the year. We, on the other hand, have a stronger economy to absorb our 4 per cent addition to the defence budget.

The fear of Indian conventional superiority, the difficulty of dealing with Indian 8216;no-first-use8217; and assured retaliation nuclear doctrine has robbed Pakistan of its nuclear fantasies. It finally resorted to nuclear hype itself a proof that the Indian threat of conventional limited war was working to blackmail Washington and partially succeeded since it suited the US to be blackmailed.

But we need to remember that historically, coercive diplomacy, can at best produce short-term gains. It must be situated in a dynamic framework to deal with changing conditions.

This links us to the third issue. Successful strategy requires that we maintain our position on the high ground of politics, military confrontation and international diplomacy. Keeping Pakistan on the back foot, even through calibrated 8216;de-escalation8217; and possible re-escalation, and retaining the military-diplomatic initiative is crucial. There is need to constantly look ahead, be prepared, and pre-empt developments.

For example, what would be the post-October scenario after elections have been held in J038;K and in Pakistan? This would depend to some extent on what happens between now and then. But the central thread of Pakistan8217;s strategy is unlikely to change.

The current emphasis on stoppage of infiltration, very useful in practical terms but even more important in the potential for demoralising the militants inside J038;K, tends to shift the focus from ends to means. There is also a very high probability that this in turn would appear to emphasise that militancy and terrorism in J038;K is indigenous leaving Pakistan diplomatically off the hook as the state sponsoring terrorism.

Any elected government in Islamabad, with its wings clipped before it learns to fly, would have to grapple with populist measures under domestic pressures, especially of the religious extremists.

In all likelihood, it will be a weak government and have no option but to perpetuate the traditional Kashmir policy of the men on horseback Junejo stepped up terrorism in Punjab. The degree of success in elections in J038;K would provide a corresponding degree of strength to deal with any intensification of Pakistani strategy.

But the continued interference by Islamabad through the so-called dialogue would remain a complicating factor in achieving peace, reconciliation and progress in the state. This is where different groups pressing their narrow agendas, be it the trifurcation-ayatollahs or the autonomy-wallahs, have to look closely at the emerging situation to ensure the challenges are not compounded for parochial ends.

Fourthly, the ongoing military deployment should have provided food for serious thought regarding the nature of force structures that we would need to deal with the challenges of military employment in future.

In rational terms, if war is an extension of politics by other means, then the use of force without war must remain so. The theory of military power and its employment, therefore, must define the ends we seek.

In this context, two of the three classical Clausewitzean dictums have been made redundant by the introduction of nuclear weapons: that is, territory and destruction of the adversary8217;s military could hardly be considered rational political objectives.

If that is so, then the third, the will of the nation, assumes even greater salience than ever before. This is intensified by other factors, not the least by the increasing vulnerability of countries to punitive destruction by conventional military power.

In the present case, the end objective has been clear: alter Pakistan8217;s policy of cross-border terrorism seen by it as a low-cost option safe under the nuclear umbrella. Our actions have led to substantive success. But more will have to be done in the future.

In the long-term perspective, we have to ensure that conventional capabilities are strengthened, not so much for destruction of enemy forces or occupation of his territory even for negotiating purposes, but to apply punitive force to alter policy.

The parameters of the cost-benefit ratio of the way military power must be applied are changing; and we need to take note of that.