
Does Pakistan have a basic national strategic doctrine? If so, who has prescribed it? If no such doctrine has been publicly enunciated, can it be inferred from Pakistan8217;s behaviour over the past 52 years?
The two-nation theory has become the ideology of the ruling establishment of that country, contrary to its founding fathers8217; vision of Pakistan as a secular state. Little wonder that, for them, the agenda of Partition remains unfinished in Kashmir.
This background overshadows Pakistani policies in the field of national security. Their consistency lays bare the strategic doctrine which lies underneath. Kargil was thus an episode in the long chain of events, all strung together by one strategic thought. The two-nation theory compels the Pakistani establishment to regard India as a permanent adversary. The intensity of the antagonistic mindset gets manifested even in hockey and cricket fields.
This doctrine has been forcing Pakistan to create conditions for the annexation of Kashmir, whatever the methodor cost. Efforts at India8217;s destabilisation become a part of the ancillary process. In the ultimate analysis, this boils down to the Clausewitzian concept of war as a continuation of politics. In its singlemindedness, the Pakistani establishment refuses to concede that this principle cannot operate in the contemporary world. A certain coherence is seen in its decision-making process to achieve this objective. Strategic goals have been projected as feasible over a certain length of time. Militancy in Punjab, insurgency in Kashmir and the Northeast, terrorism in various parts of India, and now Kargil, are all a part of an agenda deliberately set by Pakistan for itself vis-a-vis India. This psyche throws caution and rationality to the winds, deception and surprise being the keys to success.
Geo-economics rather than geo-politics is the guiding consideration in the New World order. Nations are surrendering sovereignty to achieve greater integration and strength. Greater security is seen in greater economicpower. Enemies are turning into friends. National security has today many parameters apart from the might of the military machine. The guardians of a state have to display a philosophical understanding of the contemporary universal trends and also evolve a matching political understanding. Those who control Pakistan8217;s national security policies fail to understand that the security of a developing country is best secured through the holistic development of its people. These controllers allow no discretion to the country8217;s statesmen, of whom there are not many, nor tolerate any voice of sanity which may occasionally be sought to be raised.
Who constitutes this establishment which refuses to permit a balance between values and necessity? Essentially, it is the military brass with a sprinkling of top bureaucrats and a few members of the feudal-industrial class. Within this coterie, the real power resides with the military. Occasionally, other elements may display some sort of schizophrenia about how to dealwith India, but the military brass never does.
The generals seem firmly to believe that a compromise on Kashmir is emotionally impossible. They have no desire to rein in the ISI which is permitted a great deal of autonomy within a wide charter of objectives. The ethnic composition of the armed forces rules out a different image of India. The military training manuals leave no doubt in the trainees8217; minds that India is a hostile country, with which scores have to be settled. Even primary school textbooks echo this thought. Many generations will have to go by before a qualitative change in the thinking of the armed forces can occur. In fact, the prospect for such a change must be considered rather bleak since the younger levels in the military forces are believed to be more fundamentalist and Talibanised today than the earlier generations. It is relevant to recall that the three Chiefs of Staff of Pakistan had refused the Pakistani prime minister8217;s directions to be present at Lahore to welcome his Indiancounterpart.
The national security doctrine in Pakistan is not shaped by the pluralistic reality of Pakistan. The doctrine, therefore, does not reflect the concerns or the aspirations of society at large. Variables arising from the domestic scene or the changing patterns of international thinking get ignored. An extreme folly of a nuclear-weapon state crossing the frontiers of another nuclear-weapon state can thus be committed with complete innocence.
Does Islam play any defining role in determining Pakistan8217;s national security approach? Though Islam is the basis of the two-nation theory, its influence on shaping the Pakistani national security doctrine is limited. President Zia-ul Haq and civilian leaders who followed him used Islam to legitimise themselves or stay in power but were careful to ensure that real power did not actually pass into the hands of Islamic leaders. Power always remained in the hands of a civil-military combine, which protected the interests of their support base and allowed only aperipheral influence to Islamic zealots.
Islam-pasand8217; parties serve just as instruments in the hands of those who control the national security apparatus. Such groups are the favourites of the ISI. The relationship between them does serve a national security purpose. The Mujahideens can be grafted into the national security effort. For the diehard obscurantist, the jihad can be positioned within the overall structure of the two-nation theory. Absence of true democracy in Pakistan over long periods and the consequent slow growth of representative institutions have kept the power of the armed forces fairly untouched. Nawaz Sharif, the strongest prime minister ever, is unable to overturn this reality. He can be disposed of any time the generals so desire. He has, therefore, to tread with caution, balancing between the dictates of their national security policies and the requirements of moving Pakistan into a new millennium of development and prosperity.
India must keep a very sharp eye on Pakistan and bealways ready for the worst. Contrary to what Defence Minister George Fernandes declared after the cessation of hostilities in Kargil, the war is not yet over and, in fact, cannot be over while India remains a target of aggression in other forms. In such an environment, Track II and III8217; diplomacy has little future. Costly errors were made in the past in working on the premise of good faith with Pakistan. Gears of policy now need to shift to leave Pakistan in no doubt that the pursuit of its current national security doctrine will bring in its wake unacceptable damage.
The writer is a former secretary, cabinet secretariat