Giving his keynote address at the Goa Maritime Conclave, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh referred to the concept of “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to underscore the need for countries to collaborate with each other instead of working at cross purposes. “The concept of the Prisoner's Dilemma, when applied in the domain of international relations, can explain and analyse various situations where countries face strategic decision-making challenges. For example, when two or more countries engage in an arms race, they often do so out of mutual fear and mistrust,” said Singh. “The challenge is to find solutions that promote cooperation, build trust, and mitigate the risks associated with the Prisoner's Dilemma situations in international relations,” he added. What is Prisoner’s Dilemma? Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to one of the most popular “games” in Game Theory, which is itself a branch of science that helps understand how people/entities behave under different circumstances. By simulating a game, Game Theory also shows how to achieve the best outcome. For instance, it may appear straight-forward that a person or a country must always do what appears to provide them with the best pay-off. However, real life is complex and filled with uncertainty. Moreover, the final outcome depends on the actions of other people/countries as well. To be sure, the final outcome could change if the other party/parties act in conflict. For instance, as the Defence Minister alluded to, if in a bid to secure one’s borders, a country starts hoarding more and more arms then it may — far from achieving that goal— start an arms race with the other country. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game that brings out this paradox clearly. Suppose two people — A and B — are brought in for questioning about a crime. However, the evidence with the police is circumstantial and the best that they can hope to achieve is to put both A and B in jail for a year each. Unless, of course, they get more credible evidence. One way to do this is to get the prisoners to rat out each other. So the police officer puts both A and B in separate rooms and provides both of them with a simple choice: If one prisoner says the other is involved in the crime, he can go scot-free while the other will be given a 15-year jail term. Of course, if neither prisoner confesses, they both will only get one year’s jail time. What if both confess? In that case, their jail times will be 10 years each. The pay-offs for each prisoner in this “game” can be summarised in the matrix below: Simply put, the prisoner’s dilemma is whether to confess or stay silent. What should the prisoners do, then? On the face of it, staying silent appears like the right course of action. If both prisoners stay silent, they get away with the best pay-off — that is, just serving one year in prison. But can either of them be sure that while they stay silent, the other will not rat them out? The fact is that if either of the prisoners stays silent, they run the risk of facing the maximum prison time (15 years). However, if both confess, they condemn each other to 10 years of jail time. If one cannot be sure of the other prisoner’s behaviour, then — and this is the paradox — confessing is the way forward. The best outcome, of course, lies in co-operation. If both prisoners co-operate, they can achieve the best outcome and get away with just a year in prison. This dilemma (and its answers) has many real life applications both in international law as well as in business. For instance, should two companies selling the same product — say ice creams — keep undercutting each other by reducing the price in order to corner the market share? Could repeated use of this strategy lead them to reduce prices to such a level that it becomes economically unviable to stay in business? Would it not be better for them to agree on a floor price so that they can both earn healthy enough profits? Similarly, should countries set some ground rules in geopolitics to ensure they don’t enter an arms race that will eventually prove ruinous for their own economies and people?
