Opinion Express View on one year of Ukraine war: For India, a tightrope walk that is bound to get tighter
New Delhi needs to be constantly vigilant on the possible need to recalibrate its relationship with Moscow and, at the same time, ensure that its interests are protected
As the war enters its second year, that tightrope walk will get tighter — New Delhi needs to be constantly vigilant on the possible need to recalibrate its relationship with Moscow and, at the same time, ensure that its interests are protected. 
As the battle zones of Ukraine gear up for significant military escalation on the first anniversary of the Russian aggression that falls this week, the challenge for New Delhi is to take a fresh and hard look at its assumptions about the war. Like most chancelleries in the world, including Washington, London and Berlin, Delhi, too, believed that Russia would prevail in a short and decisive invasion of Ukraine. But a year later, the government in Kyiv is still standing, thanks to the courageous resistance from the Ukrainian people. And there is limited prospect for ending this conflict. It is easy to point to the massive Western military support to Kyiv but no amount of weapons could have substituted for the popular will of Ukraine to defend itself. In any case, Western military support began to flow in only after Ukraine pushed back the initial Russian offensive. The battle for Ukraine may be a “proxy fight” between Russia and the West but that can’t be used to deny the legitimate right of Ukraine to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity against foreign occupation. Deftly walking the tightrope in New Delhi has so far helped in practical pursuit of India’s interests — be it meeting its energy requirements to defence supplies and to have more diplomatic elbow room vis a vis other powers. Of course, Indian equities in the Russian relationship are real and significant and there is an acceptance, even if grudging, of this in other capitals. Moscow should know that this doesn’t mean India will turn a blind eye to all Russian transgressions in Ukraine. For, even from a realpolitik perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine casts a shadow on India’s long-term interests.
Moscow may have its reasons to call it a “special military operation” but New Delhi doesn’t need to fudge that basic question. Ironically, it was Czar Nicholas II of Russia who had called the First Hague Convention of 1899 that began the codification of the laws of war and norms of pacific settlement of disputes between nations. That Russia can disregard these rules sets a disturbing precedent. If Russia gets away with the invasion of Ukraine, it would encourage other revisionist powers to seize the territory of their neighbours through use of force. Like Russia in Europe, China has multiple territorial disputes on land and maritime frontiers and its protracted stand-off with India on the Line of Actual Control remains deadlocked. Equally consequential for India is the deepening alliance between Russia and China that poses a challenge to India’s interests amidst the sharpening contradictions between New Delhi and Beijing.
As the war enters its second year, that tightrope walk will get tighter — New Delhi needs to be constantly vigilant on the possible need to recalibrate its relationship with Moscow and, at the same time, ensure that its interests are protected. The G20 this year and the run-up to it create a space and many opportunities to articulate and fine-tune this stand. That’s the only way to better prepare for the massive geopolitical consequences of this war.
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