Opinion Express View: India’s calculated risk of nuclear weapons paid off

Between May 18, 1974, and May 11, 1998, one of the worst-kept secrets in the global strategic community was India’s nuclear capability. Despite conducting a nuclear explosion test, the establishment in New Delhi was encumbered by the moral dilemma of becoming a nuclear power. Since its independence, India had been a champion of non-proliferation in the international community and there was concern about its declaration of nuclear weapon prowess. There were also apprehensions about how India would weather the international reaction, including economic sanctions, and that the ensuing arms race with Pakistan could help the latter level the playing field. Exactly 25 years ago, at Pokhran, that trepidation was overcome. And it is now clear that the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s calculated risk paid off.

In the aftermath of the tests on May 11 and 13, the US-led economic sanctions did not have the disastrous effects they once could have — post-liberalisation, the Indian economy had grown enough to hold its own. On the strategic front, the civil nuclear deal — pushed by George Bush Jr and Manmohan Singh — ensured that India became a de facto nuclear power. Since that time, the two countries have drawn closer. Pakistan, on the other hand, was increasingly seen as an unreliable nuclear state, and there was real concern that extremist groups could gain access to its nuclear weapons. The aftermath of Pokhran II also led to a rethink of India’s external orientation: With China blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the notion that double standards regarding non-proliferation were merely a conceit of the US and the West was undermined. India’s becoming a nuclear power also had effects vis a vis its hostile neighbours. With respect to China, it has helped balance the military asymmetry by ensuring a credible deterrent. Soon after the n-tests, India beat back Pakistan at Kargil — the US, for the first time, did not lean towards Pakistan in a conflict with India. More recently, strikes against Pakistan in the aftermath of the Uri and Pulwama attacks showed that Rawalpindi’s nuclear capability does not give it a free pass.

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For many critics at the time, Pokhran II represented a departure from India’s stated commitment to peace. It is clear now that Delhi’s nuclear arsenal is a means for credible minimum deterrence — its “no first use” policy is a part of that promise. Complete nuclear disarmament should be a global goal. However, given the realities of the post-atomic age, that is unlikely any time soon. Meanwhile, India today is a responsible nuclear power and in its journey, May 11, 1998, is a major milestone.