In August 2021, there was a barely disguised triumphalism in Rawalpindi and Islamabad after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the swift takeover of the country by the Taliban. Then PM Imran Khan had said that the Taliban’s return marked the Afghan people “breaking the shackles of slavery” and there was talk from senior members of the government about the “creation of a new bloc” in the region. The clashes between the two countries on Pakistan’s western border — Afghanistan retaliated with strikes across the Durand Line after Pakistan targeted what it called hideouts for militants in the former — mark a deterioration of ties and the deepening of instability in an already volatile region.
For long, the Pakistan state has sought “strategic depth” on its western front vis-a- vis its conflict with India. At a time when the focus must be on economic reforms and expanding state capacity, the army seems to be sinking deeper into the morass of its own making. Land-locked Afghanistan, facing sanctions and with a regime that is not officially recognised by much of the world may need Islamabad’s support for the time being. However, Rawalpindi and Islamabad would be ill-advised to underestimate the depth of the grievances of the Pashtun, who have suffered for the better part of five decades. Military force can only be one aspect of dealing with an insurgency. The degree of maturity with which Pakistan deals with the current unrest and violence will be watched closely in New Delhi. That may well be among the defining elements for both regional security and bilateral ties.
