Opinion The impasse in Ladakh: Two years on, the government continues to be silent on events at Kailash Heights

It is clear that the government will continue with the gag on Ladakh and Kailash Heights, and cover it with the glow of the G20 presidency. Like Balakot, Modi requires another Snow Leopard to unlock the status quo and restore deterrence

Trading Chushul Heights for the Fingers area will rankle as a serious error of judgement that squandered a strategic advantage in securing RSQA.

Ashok K Mehta

February 10, 2023 09:33 AM IST First published on: Feb 10, 2023 at 07:04 AM IST

Today (February 10) is two years since India vacated the commanding heights of Kailash Ridge, surrendering its trump card in Restoring Status Quo Ante (RSQA) May 2020 in East Ladakh. On February 11, 2021, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh informed Parliament that an agreement had been reached that will “substantially restore status quo May 5, 2020, and achieve complete disengagement at the earliest. Talks between senior commanders within 48 hours of disengagement will take place to resolve remaining issues including resumption of patrolling”. Neither has happened, as fresh facts are available

Operation Snow Leopard on the South Bank of Pangong Tso, executed by Tibetans of the elite Special Frontier Force (SFF) on August 29-30, 2020, took the PLA by complete surprise. The lightning seizure of Chushul Heights on the Kailash Range, with tanks deployed at Rezang La and Rechin La, was described by the then Northern Army Commander Lt General Y K Joshi as a “gamechanger”. Simultaneously, a brigade occupied the Fingers area on the North Bank about which little is still known. Joshi said operations were intended for “unlocking disengagement” frozen since the Galwan clash and creating a bargaining lever for RSQA May 2020. By August 31, the SFF was built to brigade-strength but troops did not cross the LAC, as they should have, to occupy Black Top and Helmet Top, which the PLA seized along with the gaps between SFF positions. At places, Chinese tanks came within 30 to 50 metres of Indian tanks. Between August 29 and September 7, four firing incidents occurred, but mostly with no casualties.

On August 31, Army commanders and government officials engaged in the war room to prevent an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation escalating to war. Joshi described the situation as being on the “brink of war”. It seems military commanders preferred to de-escalate and withdraw, while government mandarins opposed it, as this would forfeit the military advantage. Until now, it was not known who in the government “blinked first”, given the Army tenet, “no blinking, no brinkmanship”. Joshi justified withdrawal from Chushul Heights as it was not an “advantage in perpetuity”. Obtaining PLA withdrawal from Finger 3 to east of Finger 8 was equally imperative as was the removal of the Chinese flag and “China” written in Mandarin, both seen as an embarrassment. Chinese withdrawal was interpreted by Joshi as a “loss of face” for China.

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But trading Chushul Heights for the Fingers area squandered a strategic advantage in securing RSQA. Indian troops were seasoned and weather-hardened from decades of deployment in high-altitude Sikkim, Siachen and Ladakh. Between September and February, both sides offered their plans for withdrawal — India demanding complete disengagement and China resisting strongly. Finally, the Joshi formula to trade Chushul Heights for the Fingers area prevailed. Troops remained deployed till February 10, 2021, when disengagement started. Despite Joshi’s fear of escalation, the key reason for vacating Kailash Ridge, the SFF held ground for five months. The Chinese reneged on their promise to resolve all remaining friction points during talks held within 48 hours of disengagement. The pullback from Gogra occurred in August 2021 and Hot Springs in September 2022, leaving two critical offensive launchpads for India at Demchok and Depsang unresolved and blocked by the PLA.

On July 15, 2021, it was reported that the PLA had flouted the demilitarisation agreement of February 2021 and reoccupied Black Top and Helmet Top, preempting Indian return to these heights. This report was neither confirmed nor denied by the government. Former NSA Shivshankar Menon observed: “We don’t know what happened on the South Bank as we know about the North Bank.” After its disengagement from Hot Springs in September 2022, the PLA said that it “will not accept the status quo of May 2020 created by India illegally crossing the LAC”.

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Last month, MEA officials told me that having surprised us on the ground, the Chinese joined the talks from a position of “power and strength”. The officials admitted that transgressions (not intrusions/incursions) are due to “overlapping perceptions” regarding LAC and the government insisted there is no loss of territory. They added: “No military breakthrough is likely and RSQA May 2020 is a pipe dream. DMZs will continue as new patrolling arrangements are minted (a relevant fact presented in last month’s DGP’s conference is that India had lost the use of 26 of 65 patrolling points between Karakoram Pass and Demchok). We don’t see any grand bargain like India accepting the DMZ for China recognising the McMahon Line. The problem of graziers is likely to be resolved by each side escorting their graziers.”

The mandarins said that summit-level diplomacy is unlikely even as India will hold the presidency of the G20 and the SCO where President Xi Jinping is likely to come. Clearly, the government will continue with the gag on Ladakh, including about the folly of vacating Kailash Heights, and cover it with the glow of the G20 presidency for which it sought a one-year deferral. Like Balakot, PM Modi requires another Snow Leopard to unlock the status quo and restore deterrence.

The writer is a retired Major General of the Indian Army