Opinion The Great Game Folio
The Sindhi nationalist card is for showing and not playing; at least for now. That is the message from the beleaguered President Asif Ali Zardari...
Sindh Card
The Sindhi nationalist card is for showing and not playing; at least for now. That is the message from the beleaguered President Asif Ali Zardari and his Pakistan Peoples Party. As the political crisis deepens in Pakistan and the pressure mounts on Zardari to quit,there has been widespread speculation that Zardari might be tempted to play the Sindh card. The PPPs decision to hold the Sindhi Topi Day earlier this month had fueled this speculation. After the Supreme Courts judgment last week undermined Zardaris political moral authority,the Sindh provincial assembly was quick to affirm its faith in the president. Many in the PPP are angry that Pakistans establishment is once again destroying a government led by a Sindhi. They recall the Armys coup against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his eventual hanging in the late 1970s and the ouster of Benazir Bhuttos two governments in the 1990s. Whipping up the nationalist sentiment in Sindh,Zardari appears to have decided,will play right into the hands of the Pakistan Army. Nor would the PPP be smart to abandon its enduring support bases in other provinces,especially in the Punjab. The PPPs emphasis for now is on affirming the partys nationalist contributions,exposing the different standards to which Zardari is being subjected to,and on utilising all available political and legal means to defend the presidency and the government. As he travels in Sindh this week,Zardari is expected to formally downplay the ethnic card while informally consolidating it as the possible last option to push away the political noose tightening around his neck. The PPP clearly needs a broad national platform than Sindhi nationalism to survive the current political challenge. And his best hope is some kind of an understanding with Nawaz Sharif,the leader of Pakistan Muslim League and a former prime minister.
Sensible Sharif
While Zardari and PPP fight with their backs to the wall,Sharif looks better and better. Unlike many members of his party demanding Zardaris resignation,Sharif has held back. Deliberately. He has sought to maintain a balance between opposing the PPP and playing into the hands of the Army,which is the principal beneficiary of Zardaris loss of political authority. Over the last two years,Sharif has constantly exposed the unwillingness of Zardari to look beyond his own narrow political interests and strengthen Pakistans civilian institutions and democratic norms.
Sharif backed the lawyers movement earlier this year for the restoration of judges ousted in the last phase of the military rule,urged Zardari to shed some of the presidencys powers accumulated under Musharraf,and pressed him to return to a joint civilian front that will limit the dominance of the Army. Having been a victim of Army coup in 1999,Sharif understands the dangers of aligning with the GHQ to defeat the civilian opponents. That could change indeed if the Army and Sharif come to terms with each other. There has been no public indication so far of Sharif seeking one. While he could not persuade Zardari to follow reason during the last two years,Sharif has managed to elevate his personal political standing both within Pakistan and outside. There are some indications that Washington may be looking at Sharif as a possible option if the Zardari government implodes in the not too distant future.
Obamas options
Pakistans internal political crisis could not have come at a worse time for Washington. Its plan to launch a short but intense campaign against the al Qaida and the Taliban in the next two years require a measure of coherence in Pakistan. If the civilian leaders in Pakistan do not close ranks and find some common ground with the Army to defeat violent extremism,there is little chance that President Barack Obamas new Afghanistan strategy will work.
As so often in the past plays of the Great Game,the fragility of local politics in the Subcontinents north-western marches may well trump the grand strategic designs in distant capitals. If President George W. Bushs political intervention in 2007 forced Gen. Pervez Musharraf to cede space to the civilians,the terms of that deal have now unraveled,creating a fresh political crisis. The fate of Obamas interventions to stabilise Pakistan may turn out to be no different; for it is not easy putting together Pakistans humpty-dumpty.
The writer is Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress,Washington DC
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