Opinion Subjects to citizens

In an ideal economy,NREGA would become less necessary. But the direction of its institutionalisation suggests that it will acquire characteristics of a classic welfare scheme,rather than a scheme of last resort. Second,the government is also proposing an ambitious convergence programme,where NREGA is allied to a host of other programmes. At some level,this convergence may be sensible,but designing an architecture that does not derail existing schemes in the name of convergence is going to be a tricky issue. In particular,crucial choices will have to be made about who retains the final decision-making authority over the form convergence takes at the local level.

But perhaps the most important reason is the fact that for the first time the ministry of rural development and the ministry of panchayati raj have the same minister. This provides an occasion to resolve what has been a perpetual tension in the way government thinks about the architecture of rural service delivery. On the one hand,there are what we might call schemers. These are officials who think largely in the framework of Centrally-sponsored schemes,bureaucratic largesse from above with all kinds of conditionalities. On the other hand,there are genuine decentralisers,for whom the objective of rural service delivery is not simply about the implementation of Centrally-sponsored schemes,but about genuine empowerment of the local panchayat system. The conflict between the two is not always stark. Sometimes,Centrally-sponsored schemes can be used to strengthen panchayat institutions,as happened in the case of NREGA. Although even here,it has to be said,often the success of the scheme depended upon bypassing panchayats,rather than strengthening them.

New Delhi has largely been dominated by schemers rather than genuine decentralisers. States have certainly for the most part opposed genuinely strengthening panchayat institutions,fearing a loss of their own power. But support for decentralisation at the Centre has also been more symbolic than real. There is considerable evidence of this. Despite the 73rd Amendment,the constitutional status of panchayats in terms of being able to perform a range of functions remains very fragile. There is also considerable irony in the fact that most of the states where panchayats have deeply institutionalised after the 73rd Amendment were also states where these institutions did well before the amendment.

The amendment itself has turned out to be a weaker instrument for local empowerment. There is a vexed question about the relationship between elected local officials and the bureaucracy; by and large the bureaucracy has had the upper hand in this relationship. There is still relatively little clarity about what functions should be performed at what level and why; the subsidiarity principle is evoked largely as a gesture. Finally,there is the perennial argument of the schemers: we cannot transfer funds,functions and functionaries to panchayats because they have no capacity. In this argument,capacity has been judged,not by the ability to mobilise locally relevant knowledge for taking simple decisions,but by the ability to conform to bureaucratic canons of standardisation. No argument has been more beautifully self-fulfilling: since they don’t have capacity,don’t devolve real power to them; since they don’t have real power,don’t build up their capacity. This debate has gone on for 60 years and it is high time panchayats were endowed with genuine administrative capacity.

There has also been another political paradox at the heart of the panchayat system. In order to avoid capture by local elites,reservation and rotation were introduced. These instruments may have had the effect of prising open local power structures a little bit. But they also have vitiated the political strength of the panchayat system as a whole for two reasons. One of the attractions of local government was supposed to be that citizens could reward and punish elected officials on performance; the more local the government,the easier it is to make judgments about the distinguishing character of politicians. This mechanism has become relatively meaningless. Due to the fact that elected officials cannot now create an enduring political base,their bargaining power in relation to other political functionaries and the state is also reduced.

Now there is an unprecedented historical opportunity to genuinely empower panchayats. The scale of funding and number of functionaries available under various schemes is now truly staggering. And if the control of some of these is transferred to the panchayats,their significance and capacity will be enhanced dramatically. The minister in charge,C.P. Joshi,is a veteran of panchayat matters,with a sophisticated understanding of the political,constitutional and administrative issues involved; the fact that he has both ministries should allow him to resolve the tension between the schemers and the decentralisers decisively. Oddly enough,there is also now considerable analytical depth to our understanding of local governance in rural India,in stark contrast to our near ignorance about the dynamics of local government in urban India. Joshi’s predecessor,Mani Shankar Aiyar,was consistently right about one broad theme: you cannot,in the long run,have inclusive growth without inclusive governance. There is no way of having genuinely inclusive governance in rural India without strengthening panchayat institutions. Welfare schemes are important,but taken alone they do not complete our transformation from subjects to citizens.

The writer is president,Centre for Policy Research,Delhi

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