Opinion Safety in numbers
The recently concluded Assembly elections in three states have put the focus back on the integrity of the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM).
The recently concluded Assembly elections in three states have put the focus back on the integrity of the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM). Some say that the machines can be manipulated; others say these can be hacked to favour a particular candidate. The machines are sometimes labeled faulty and unreliable.
I recently attended a meeting in Maharashtra as the observer of the Election Commission of India (ECI) where this issue was hotly debated. Representatives of some political parties wanted us to ensure that the machines were not manipulated through remote control. On another occasion,a senior IT professional wondered: what if a software module is embedded in the hardware,hidden in the sleeper mode,that could be activated to corrupt the machine at a later time. He was drawing a parallel with the Bluetooth feature that Apple has provided in one of the models of their iPhone that is to be activated at a later date. Both apprehensions are reasonable.
To examine the veracity of such claims and apprehensions,the voting process through EVMs needs to be put into perspective. For the uninitiated,the EVMs comprise two interconnected units. The first,called the control unit,lets the polling official enable the voter to cast her vote once her identity is verified. This unit also stores and computes the poll-related data like number of votes polled for each candidate and total number of votes. In the second unit,called the ballot unit,the voter casts her vote by pressing a button alongside the name of the candidate and symbol of the political party.
Universally,the electronic voting based election process consists of five stages: (1) device initialisation or preparation,(2) voting,(3) early reporting in case of India,only the total is tallied with the voters register,(4) tabulation,and (5) auditing.
Now,consider the hacking possibilities. Any electronic or IT-enabled system could be hacked or have its security compromised either by (1) an outsider attack,or (2) manipulation by people who officially manage the process (an insider job). Let us examine the risks on both counts and see how these are mitigated in the Indian context.
For an outsider attack to be possible,the fpre-requisite is access. As opposed to many other computerised voting systems,our EVMs,manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited,are designed to work as standalone systems.
Other computer based voting systems use generalised hardware and operating systems/applications (usually written in C++ family of languages) resident in flash memories,rendering them susceptible to manipulation. On the other hand,the software in the EVM is fused permanently onto the integrated circuits that cannot be retrieved,altered or accessed. According to the manufacturer BEL,the unique signature of every controller used in the machine is checked for authenticity,generating evidences if tampered with. During voting and the subsequent counting process,the EVMs are never connected to any network or device.
Other skeptics express apprehensions about the possibility of manipulation by way of an insider job. For this,we need to understand the complete voting process where EVMs are used. When the EVMs are prepared a few days prior to polling day,the candidates are permitted to inspect each machine and witness mock poll demonstrations. Subsequently,these machines are securely stored in rooms that are sealed in the presence of the candidates,with apt security. Before the actual voting begins at 8 AM on the poll day,the polling officers at each booth are required to hold mock polls from 7 AM to 8 AM in front of election agents. Let us assume a worst-case scenario where a polling official changes the hardware module causing the machine to malfunction. This is bound to be detected during the mock poll,either at the preparation stage,or on the poll day. In that eventuality,the faulty EVM is immediately replaced. Let us go a step further and assume that a smarter devil somehow accesses the hardware and programmes the machine in such a way that the machine works perfectly during the mock poll but malfunctions during the actual poll. Since nobody,including our hacker,knows the number of mock-poll iterations after which the actual poll will be held,he cannot succeed through a pre-written malicious software. Finally,during counting of votes,the tabulation of results is done manually in the presence of counting agents of political parties. In addition,the audit of one-fifth of the machines,selected at random,is required to be done by the ECI observer. Hence the integrity of these processes cannot be compromised.
As an abundant precaution that mitigates further risk of an insider job,the Election Commission of India has introduced randomisation at different stages. The EVMs are assigned to various constituencies through a software-driven randomised allocation. Even within a constituency,allocation to a particular polling booth is randomised. As a further check,randomisation is done in presence of the representatives of political parties and contesting candidates,and is supervised by an independent ECI observer.
Does it then mean that our EVMs are so hi-tech that they are superior to the computer based voting systems practiced worldwide,especially in the US? I put forth this very question to Harvard Professor L. Jean Camp on a snowy day in the spring of 2004,while attending her course on (Cyber) Security and Privacy. After detailed discussions and several cups of coffee,the conclusion was: a big yes.
The writer is an IAS officer working in Rajasthan. Views expressed are personal
Share
