Opinion Intelligence design

For a proper understanding of the issues involved,it may be necessary to look at how the concept of the US Counter-Terrorism Centre evolved. In 1985,there was a series of terrorist incidents in various parts of the world,including at the Rome and Vienna airports. Duane Clarridge,a CIA officer tasked to prepare a concept paper on innovative ways to combat terrorism,realised that there was an inherent problem in the organisational structure of the CIA (which is also true of most intelligence agencies). It had separate directorates of intelligence,operations and science & technology,besides regional directorates which had strict geographical boundaries. He observed that with such a structure,the CIA could not effectively deal with acts of transnational terrorism,especially those committed by stateless Palestinians. He proposed the setting up of an inter-disciplinary centre with global reach in the Directorate of Operations,which would combine the resources of all the directorates,including analysts from the Directorate of Intelligence and technicians from the Directorate of Science & Technology. Following a presidential finding on terrorism authorising covert action by the CIA against terrorist groups worldwide,the CTC came into being on February 1,1986.

9/11 brought about drastic changes in the American approach to the war on terrorism. As proposed in the Intelligence Reforms and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was set up in the US under the director of National Intelligence to coordinate the working of all intelligence agencies dealing with terrorism. The official factsheet of the NCTC says that the organisation “does not direct operations or collect intelligence. It is the primary organisation in the US government for analysing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism (except purely domestic terrorism).”

A similar exercise to ensure coordination in tackling terrorism was undertaken in other Western countries and Australia,post 9/11. The most interesting among these models has been the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in the UK. In this model,representatives of all intelligence agencies,including those dealing with defence and revenue,work at a central set-up where information coming from all agencies is pooled. The representatives can pass the information available with JTAC back to their own headquarters and also access the databank of their own agency in order to verify or improve upon the information available with the JTAC,thus contributing to the common output of the JTAC. The centre works under the overall direction of the MI5 director. However,the day-to-day functioning of the JTAC is supervised for one year by an officer,drawn on rotation from each of the agencies represented in it.

In India,the Group of Ministers recommended the setting up of a multi-agency centre in 2001 for intelligence coordination. It,however,did not materialise at least until end-2008,chiefly because the 100 additional posts that the Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) wanted for setting it up were not forthcoming. In many ways,therefore,it is a matter of satisfaction that the Union home ministry now plans to set up an NCTC with adequate manpower and adequate powers to collect intelligence,take preventive action,respond with armed might if a terrorist attack takes place,arrest the accused,seize their weapons and other incriminating property,investigate the cases,prosecute the accused and get them punished. From a purely anti-terrorism point of view,this is certainly a terrific idea. After all,organisations like the Narcotics Control Bureau already exercise powers of search or arrest all over India (admittedly in respect of special enactments) without stepping on the toes of the state police. Besides,the director,IB,now,in effect,becomes the Chief of Homeland Security,taking off a great deal of workload which the National Security Adviser was carrying on his shoulders so far. The creation of the post of a Director of National Intelligence on the US pattern in India,to ease the workload of the NSA,was obviously not feasible and this is the next best solution.

But the chief ministers may not necessarily share these perceptions. That is because none of the CTC models referred to above provides for powers of arrest. The obvious question,therefore,is why the NCTC in India requires such powers which successful models elsewhere do not enjoy. Another obvious question is why another designated authority under the Centre when the NIA is already there. An uncomfortable question which may crop up is whether intelligence agencies in India,which now have powers of arrest,can continue to be exempted from parliamentary oversight. The intelligence community may like to know whether the JTAC model,in which all agencies would have a chance,by turn,to supervise the CTC’s day-to-day work under the overall direction of the DIB,would not have been a more satisfactory option. Some DGPs may want to know why it is being presumed that the local police would refuse to act if information is shared with them regarding a terrorist act which is likely to take place in their jurisdiction. Other police chiefs may want to know whether any system is in place to ensure that they would be kept informed and briefed about the progress of investigation in terrorism cases handled by the NCTC or NIA.

Further discussions between the Centre and the states are,it seems,to take place shortly. An informed debate on the basis of expert studies on the subject,particularly those which the government have relied upon in setting up the new mechanism would certainly be beneficial for the country.

The writer is a former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing
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