Opinion The India-Fiji story: In the next chapter, the three key areas of focus

First, people-to-people ties and Indian outreach in the healthcare sector will continue to be centrepieces in the India-Fiji bilateral story. This is best evidenced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s emphasis on healthcare during his press statement, where he identified it as a key determinant of a productive and prosperous Fijian society. This is also clearly affirmed by the MoUs signed by India to support the commissioning, operating, and maintaining of a 100-bed super-specialty hospital in Suva and the setting up of Jan Aushadhi Kendras in Fiji to provide affordable access to essential medicines under the Centre’s Jan Aushadhi Scheme.

The two governments have also signed a Declaration of Intent on Migration and Mobility (DOI) to facilitate the movement of skilled and semi-skilled workers and students between India and Fiji — a diplomatic effort largely aimed at helping Fiji plug its skilled labour shortage in agriculture, fisheries, and construction. It is worth noting that while India entered into only five such DOIs and mobility agreements between 1985 and 2014, this number has surged to 17 between 2015 and 2023 alone, with a DOI often understood as the first step towards concluding a more comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA).

In recent years, a significant number of such arrangements have been with countries in the Global North. India’s newest DOI with Fiji, which appears to be India’s first such DOI with a Pacific Island Country (PIC), therefore, stands out, again, formalising India’s intent to prioritise human-centric aspects of development assistance under the broader framing of South-South cooperation.

Second, defence security architecture will become a more mainstream area of assistance for India. However, focus will likely continue to be on maritime capacity building and training. Per the joint statement, the two countries have devised a Defence and Security Action Plan to deepen their defence and security cooperation. As per the plan, India will permanently station a Defence Attaché in Suva, thereby creating a formal channel for defence coordination between the two countries. India has also committed to gifting two sea ambulances to Fiji’s armed forces and assisting Fiji with its security needs vis-à-vis its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Further, an Indian Navy ship is scheduled to make a port visit in Fiji in 2025, signifying India’s intent to maintain a visible maritime presence in the Pacific. The plan therefore underscores a broader vision of security, integrating technical capacity building, humanitarian support, and maritime diplomacy.`

PM Rabuka’s interest in joining India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative also hints at a strategic deepening between the two countries. PM Rabuka’s vocal opposition to China’s military ambitions in the region — particularly following Beijing’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific in 2024 — could position Fiji as a trusted player in India’s Indo-Pacific outreach. In a recent press briefing in Australia, Rabuka explicitly rebuked China’s expanding military footprint in the Pacific and any potential plans to set up a defense base in the region, stating “If they want to come, who would welcome them? Not Fiji.”

Fiji, however, remains open and pragmatic, without aligning too closely with any one bloc. Presently, it has numerous defence and security agreements with partners like Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. It also maintains police cooperation with China. Fiji, therefore, has a balancing act to perform, navigating overlapping relationships with partners whilst asserting its sovereignty. In focusing on maritime capacity building and humanitarian support, India’s plan lays down a less intrusive and more collaborative model of engagement.

Third, the setting up of a Cyber Security Training Cell (CSTC) in Fiji, announced in the joint statement, could catalyse a greater role for India in helping safeguard digital infrastructure and regional resilience in the Pacific. Cybersecurity is a pressing concern across the Indo-Pacific. PICs, however, are particularly vulnerable to risks due to limited technical capacity; competing priorities of affordability versus security; and cybersecurity preparedness outpaced by national digital transformation efforts. Recent cyberattacks on government systems and networks in Tonga, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji reveal vulnerabilities in national infrastructure and underscore the urgency of regional cyber resilience.

India’s past engagement in cybersecurity with PICs has been modest, being largely limited to short-term training courses under its overseas assistance programme Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). In contrast, a dedicated training cell in Fiji could evolve into a regional hub, thereby supporting smaller island countries. This outcome also aligns with India’s broader cyber diplomacy efforts in South Asia and Africa and opens pathways for deeper collaboration with like-minded partners such as Australia and Japan. Any meaningful participation in this domain, however, would require India to go beyond ad-hoc training, focusing more on context-specific cybersecurity training for PICs, engaging with regional dialogues such as the Pacific Cyber Week Conference organised by Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), and coordinating investment strategies in the region.

As India deepens and diversifies its engagements with Fiji across healthcare, defense, and cybersecurity, PM Rabuka’s visit signals not just a bilateral milestone, but India’s evolving role as a collaborative partner in shaping a more resilient Pacific region.

The writer is a research analyst at Carnegie India