The long shadow of terror stalks India-Pakistan talks yet again. And a familiar pattern may be repeated. Complicity of groups in Pakistan will be exposed,but almost no meaningful cooperative action will follow. But despite this fact it is not clear that not talking to Pakistan gives us any leverage,either over the terrorists or with the international community. But it would be a mistake to premise the talk on quick results. Unravelling the geo-strategic knot of South Asia will be a long haul. But we have no option but to try. That effort itself does not make our situation worse.
But it is important to approach Pakistan with clarity. Public campaigns for peace based on sentimentalism will simply not do. Sentimentalism tries to appeal to some long buried cultural affinity. This affinity is in some senses real. But it is a historical distraction. On this view culture is the site of connection and affinity,a purity of motives that is not sullied by the divisions and egos of politics. If you read almost any piece of literature on Partition or Hindu-Muslim relations,this is the narrative. Conflict arises because a realm of spontaneous,friction-free cultural exchange is sullied by the demands of politics: by parties,by reason of state,even by democracy. This story never comes to terms with deep ideological differences or structures of power that undergird states. It has no mechanism for explaining or dealing with real fears and points of difference. And it cracks under the slightest pressure.
But the challenge this poses is that we will have to be imaginative about sending signals of reassurance. In hindsight,one of Indias biggest political mistakes was this. It cut Bhutto slack after 1971 and did not force a decisive settlement,but it failed to translate this into a political signal of Indian intention. Any negotiation has the unenviable task of balancing two objectives: not reinforcing the persecution complex that is at the source of this violence; at the same time,not letting Pakistan off the hook on terror. What instruments can achieve this is not clear. Perhaps the Musharraf-Manmohan framework or some imaginative regional compact on Afghanistan can do it. But negotiating on this psychological terrain will require a sophistication that goes beyond simple-minded notions of what constitutes victory.
Realism runs up against the internal contradictions of Pakistan. Pakistan has elements of an establishment committed to a low cost bleeding strategy against India. Exercising any other option would actually undermine their whole raison detre. Interests of power holders and interests of the people almost never coincide,especially in societies undergoing stress. The realistic option threatens the very legitimacy of powerful groups. This is an issue only Pakistan can sort out,and the primary driver will remain Pakistans internal political economy.
Fourth,the involvement of outside powers in Pakistan has distorted all realist equations. These powers have and continue to feed the very same military establishment that is the source of the problem for Pakistan. They have tilted the domestic balance in favour of militarisation. They have kept the illusion alive that they can be used by Pakistan to put pressure on India,as a price for Pakistan doing their bidding. If talks are to make any progress,all external powers involved in the region will have to send an unequivocal message to Pakistan that they will not feed its persecution complex vis-à-vis India. The extent to which external powers are ready to give Pakistan this message is not clear. The logic of interest will not work unless the interests of external powers change.
Finally,Pakistan is a state in structural crisis. The issue is not simply the challenge from its western borders. The issue is more complicated. There is a story often told of Japanese Kamikaze pilots who continued on suicide missions long after the war was over,because they did not know what else to do. Pakistan has a large number of refugees from the Afghan war. And the numerous assets it built up over the years as a strategic bulwark cannot be assimilated anywhere easily. The sheer proliferation of arms and armed groups in the region makes it very likely that those with an investment in violence will continue to have a toehold.
India-Pakistan negotiations will be a high wire act. There is no shortage of action items that every Track II dialogue comes up with. But those items encounter psychological resistance,because we are not dealing with a state where a normal calculus of interests prevails. Genuine realism will require taking some political risks,and the political establishments on both sides need to understand that.
The writer is president,Centre for Policy Research,Delhi
express@expressindia.com
