Opinion Ceasefire is the right decision. But India must stay vigilant about Pakistan’s next moves

That a punitive strike was needed was never in doubt. Every Indian demanded it from the Government of India and the Armed Forces. The response needed to be professional and focused, with a deep understanding of the politico-military aim. That needed time, and time was at a premium. The decisions of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) bought time for the Armed Forces for greater preparedness. The Indian kinetic response was hard yet measured, timely and with careful selection and appropriate delivery. We did not escalate after the first delivery, except for matching responses.

The decision of the Indian government to agree to a ceasefire may be considered prudent even though there have been violations within three hours of the mutual announcements. For the better part of three days, we held back escalation beyond the second cycle, which was the delivery of the first strike after the Pahalgam attack. The mission, however, had been achieved. A long and debilitating war was never in the interest of the Government of India. If need be, we can fight the longest of wars that will reduce Pakistan to penury. But for the moment, we first need to justify our choice of options.

Our objectives have been largely achieved. We kept the escalation under tight control, not being instigated by the elements of the deep state, which had pressured even the Pakistani political leadership. We fundamentally changed the rules of engagement before agreeing to the ceasefire which, anyway, is not cast in concrete. In a well-considered statement, India made it clear that in the future, any terrorist attack will be treated as an act of war. That does not necessarily mean that India is under compulsion to launch war, but the perpetrators are warned of the option. They should know now that such an option will be seriously considered without any long-drawn process.

The short conflict marked a transformational shift in India’s strategy, which also justifies the ceasefire in some ways. There were attacks on multiple targets this time around (nine in all), including those inside Pakistan’s Punjab, the sensitive territory also targeted by the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. India did not need to pound Pakistan’s Punjab province with a “shock and awe” doctrine. Simply, the delivery of a load of TNT on the well-known terror infrastructure in Bahawalpur (Jaish-e-Mohammad), Muridke (Lashkar-e-Taiba) and Sialkot displayed a higher political will, along with a greater propensity to take a risk. India also displayed high technological capability. The demonstration of punching holes through Pakistan’s electronic air defence grid and reaching the vicinity of its various formation headquarters with a degree of impunity was also sufficient to send a message about what could happen in the future.

Pakistan will no doubt make many false claims and in its usual mode of “fake news” it will try getting the Western media to lap this up. This is something India has been alert to. The conflict termination is often more difficult than the progression of the conflict itself. Strategic communication becomes one of the greatest challenges. Pakistan is bound to declare victory and probably label it with a grand sounding Arabic term to draw affinity with the Arab world. Post conflict strategic communication will be needed to better our own outstanding efforts during conflict initiation.

The one area that will need much more serious focus is Jammu and Kashmir. I recall how three years ago, attempts were being made to reduce the organisational strength of the Rashtriya Rifles units by one-third. However, this time it’s far more serious. The Pahalgam attack and the events thereafter will need a much deeper study. Obviously, networks we earlier considered majorly dented have the capability to emerge seasonally, like those of the overground workers (OGWs). The lurking presence of highly-trained terrorists under the regular leadership of Pakistani Army personnel, with the capability to operate both on the Pir Panjal range and Kishtwar for almost two years, is worrisome. The movement of Kashmiri citizens towards greater integration, the status of radicalisation in the Muslim-dominated areas, the permanence of the halt in recruitment and the sealing off of infiltration with greater efficiency are all questions that will need much deeper answers as we move forward.

My early conclusion on ceasefire violations points to crude efforts to bring the United Nations into this issue through UNMOGIP, the oldest UN observer mission, unrecognised by India but deployed on the other side of the LoC. It would make the case for taking this to the UN for eventual plebiscite. This is a Pakistani trap which must be avoided.

There is one thing I am certain about: The absolute unlikelihood of Pakistan staying out of J&K. We must remain vigilant about that, more than ever before.

The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views are personal