Opinion Britain’s bulldog spirit?

Auden,of course,was writing before the birth of the Tory Euro-sceptic,the pinstriped effluence of an ex-imperial nation. This specimen’s ascendancy was reflected in Prime Minister David Cameron’s veto of a Europe-bolstering treaty change to defend the euro through greater fiscal cooperation and tougher sanctions on nations going Greek.

The Euro-sceptic wants less Europe not more. In the place of “ever closer union,” the Euro-sceptic wants ever looser union and,if possible,none whatsoever. In his or her — and it’s overwhelmingly his — heart beats the spirit of Britain’s “finest hour” and the United Kingdom (with a little help from the Yanks) holding out against the Luftwaffe. Only now the object of resistance is Germany’s glum Frau Merkel.

Or so the Tories see it. Since Cameron’s “No,” there’s been much chatter about the return of Britain’s “bulldog spirit.” Self-delusion is a lingering attribute of former imperial nations adjusting to a lesser reality. In fact Cameron,playing the wrong chips without partners or preparation,was not so much opposed on grand principle as eyeing an opportunity to extract concessions for the very City of London financial institutions seen as the villains of the 2008 meltdown and its dire aftermath.

That was politically inept — less the fighting spirit of the Normandy hedgerows than the self-regarding hypocrisy of the giant offshore hedge fund that Britain often resembles these days.

Even without an election five months away,Nicolas Sarkozy,the French president,would have been tempted to avoid shaking Cameron’s hand. With an election the snub for perfidious Albion was too good to pass up. Of course The Sun,the British tabloid whose dislike of Gauls is exceeded only by its disdain for Germans,shot back at Sarko: “Who do you think EU are?”

After uncertain mumblings,the deputy prime minister,Nick (“don’t call me a doormat”) Clegg,managed to reach beyond this theater to something approaching strategic reflection. Declaring himself “bitterly disappointed” at Cameron’s decision,he said: “There’s nothing bulldog about Britain hovering somewhere in the mid-Atlantic,not standing tall in Europe,not being taken seriously in Washington.”

There is no Euro-sceptic strategy; at most there’s a tactic for short-term political gain. For a long time the post-Cold-War widening of Europe to 27 members put off the need for deepening. This suited Britain,which was never interested in political union but saw advantage in a borderless European market. Now the euro crisis has exposed the need for a federative push to give the shared currency political backbone. In so doing,it has also exposed the basic British ambivalence that twice caused De Gaulle to say “Non” to UK membership.

As Warren Buffett has observed,“It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.” The mid-Atlantic,as America pivots to Asia,could prove a lonely place for Britain,whose economy is heavily dependent on the eurozone.

Of course,the fiscal pact Britain rejected still has to be turned from words into reality — and if Mario Draghi,the president of the European Central Bank,declines to provide the liquidity to keep European bond and money markets working time could still run out on the euro before reform is enacted.

Still,a watershed has been reached. The air has been cleared. The proposed pact represents a necessary if tardy admission: that the euro was an irrevocable step toward the political and particularly fiscal integration that alone can sustain the currency. Ever closer union means just that. With a touch more finesse and a lot less bombast Britain could have accompanied this process without adopting the euro. Instead,it’s isolated.

Britain’s defiant freedom and independence are real virtues proven over time. The thing about the Euro-sceptics behind Cameron’s Brussels bungling is they turn past glory into posturing theatre.