Opinion After Pahalgam, patience and precision must guide the way forward
There will be retaliation for the Pahalgam attack. It must be within a strategic framework
Significantly, from a situation where up to 7,000 terrorists rampaged across the state, often in individual armed groups numbering in the 100s, authorities estimate the total strength of active terrorists in J&K at 76 in March 2025, including 59 foreign and 17 local terrorists.(Illsutration by C R Sasikumar) 
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The attack at the Baisaran meadow near Pahalgam, where at least 25 tourists and a Valley resident were killed, reflects a significant departure in the trajectory of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). It is a breakdown of the unwritten compact between virtually all terrorist groups operating in the now Union Territory and the larger population there — that tourists would not be targeted. Virtually every family in the Valley is directly or indirectly dependent on tourism, and a collapse of the industry would inflict unendurable hardships on the entire population. Thus, even at the peak of terrorism in J&K, through the 1990s and early 2000s, tourists were excluded as targets of terrorist operations. Even in several years that saw high levels of violence, tourism was not allowed to collapse entirely. There were, of course, occasional aberrations. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), for instance, records a total of 24 incidents targeting tourists since 2000, of which 13 were incidents of killing, resulting in 44 fatalities. This excludes the latest incident in Pahalgam. Significantly, these numbers include Hindu pilgrims, who have never been part of the “implicit compact” excluding tourists as targets of terrorism.
Beyond this — and the inevitable impact the Pahalgam incident will have on the tourist industry in J&K — this most recent terrorist outrage represents no radical departure from the trajectory of the past. The incident will certainly trigger a process of adaptation on the part of the security forces, as well as at least temporary circumscription of tourist activities. Beyond this, it is unlikely to have any lasting impact on the trajectory of terrorism in the state.
It is useful to recall, here, that the flurry of incidents in the Jammu region in June-July 2024, including the attack on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims at Reasi, had provoked widespread commentary on the “strategic shift” from the Valley to the Jammu region, which had purportedly been “peaceful” before these attacks. Jammu had, in fact, recorded 59 fatalities in 2023. So there is no evidence for such a shift. There was a dilution of the forces’ deployment in the region, and a consequent weakening of the security grid. Terrorists were facing an increasingly difficult operational environment in Kashmir, and found a few opportunities to remind the Indian state of their presence in Jammu. The security vulnerabilities were addressed, and preceding patterns of terrorism — with the Valley dominating — persisted.
The most significant damage the Pahalgam incident will inflict is on the Centre’s narrative of the restoration of “normalcy” in J&K after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. At the time, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) promised “zero terrorism” in the Union Territory, and boastful assertions of burgeoning tourism as an index of such success were made — 23.6 million tourists visited J&K in 2024. The number was expected to be exceeded in the current year before the Pahalgam incident. Clearly, however, such “normalcy” and “zero terrorism” remain elusive.
But what is “normalcy”? J&K has been a theatre of terrorism for over 35 years — and at least 16 of these years saw a high-intensity conflict, with each of these recording at least 1,000 fatalities. The violence peaked in 2001, with 4,011 fatalities (all data from SATP), and bottomed out at 121 in 2012 — the point at which major political initiatives should have been launched. Instead, fatalities escalated from this point, hitting 452 in 2018, going down to 283 in 2019 — with a complete lockdown after the Centre’s action on Article 370 — to rise again to 321 in 2020. Thereafter, a steady trajectory of decline has been registered, down to 127 fatalities in 2024.
There can be no magical “solution” to the “Kashmir issue” as long as Pakistan continues to provide support to separatism and a measure of alienation persists in the UT. But a “solution” is already in play. The drop in fatalities from 4,011 to 127 is, itself a “solution”, a major success, and within a theatre of protracted conflict, a measure of “normalcy”.
Significantly, from a situation where up to 7,000 terrorists rampaged across the state, often in individual armed groups numbering in the 100s, authorities estimate the total strength of active terrorists in J&K at 76 in March 2025, including 59 foreign and 17 local terrorists. This, again, given the background, represents “normalcy” in a long-troubled region.
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The Pahalgam attack is, no doubt, an unacceptable outrage, and there will be consequences. Pakistan has sought to deny involvement, but all present indications suggest the involvement of The Resistance Front (TRF), a front organisation of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The scale and nature of the operation, as well as the profile of the participating terrorists, at least three of whom have already been named by authorities, clearly indicate TRF/LeT involvement, built on Pakistani state support, if not immediate planning and oversight.
A number of options for retaliation exist, and it may be tempting to resort to patterns preferred by the current administration in the past — the surgical strike in the wake of the Uri terrorist attack (2016), or the Balakot air strike in the wake of the Pulwama bombing (2019). These would be theatrical events that could be exploited for partisan political purposes, but with dubious operational or strategic consequences. Hysterical elements in the electronic and social media have also raised cries for open war, with little concern for capacities, capabilities and costs, or for the wider regional security environment. It is, however, covert retaliation that has the largest potential for impact, without the risks of sliding down the slippery slope to unforeseen escalation. These are decisions that must be taken unhurriedly, within a strategic framework, and not within a mindset of vengeful rage or a calculus of domestic political advantage.
The writer is founding member and executive director, Institute for Conflict Management and executive director of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
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