Opinion A yam between two rocks

Put simply,Nepal’s China card is nearly half a century old. All political parties in Nepal have played it whenever they wanted to improve their bargaining power vis-à-vis Delhi. Nepal’s elite has often described the nation’s geopolitical condition as a “yam between two rocks.”

Kathmandu’s China card is,indeed,a consequence of India’s primacy in Nepal,which in turn is rooted in geography,demography and history. As China rises,its importance for Nepal will continue to grow too; but Sino-Nepalese ties are unlikely to ever match the intensity and intimacy of India-Nepal ties. That,as Delhi knows,is at once an advantage and a disadvantage.

Actually,India’s current problems in Nepal have less to do with China than with the deep divisions within Nepal’s political class. Since the turn of the 1990s,when Nepal became democratic,its political leaders have failed to provide even a bit of political stability and a measure of decent governance. As every political formation quarrelled with itself and others,India’s special ties to Nepal repeatedly sucked it into Kathmandu’s political vortex. All the fractions in Kathmandu demand India’s support and deeply resent it when they don’t get it.

The recent talk of India’s “growing unpopularity”,then,does not mean much. India has seen much worse before,for example after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi imposed a blockade when the Nepali monarchy played the China card in the late 1980s.

In any case,India is not in a beauty contest in Kathmandu. It must live with the reality that Nepal’s political classes want India’s help to resolve the current political deadlock and at the same time fear that Delhi’s intervention might go against their individual ambitions.

The question then is not whether India should intervene in Nepal,but when,how,and under what terms. Those decisions are not imminent,but they might not be too far away.

It was,after all,India’s diplomatic interventions that united the mainstream political parties and the Maoists against the monarchy in 2005,prevented the then king,Gyanendra,from unleashing a bloodbath against peaceful protestors in 2006,and promoted a peace accord for the integration of the Maoists into the mainstream of Nepal’s political life.

If it is India’s burden to assist Nepal in resolving its frequent internal crises,China is a free-rider that can deal with whoever is in power at any given time,and exploit the inevitable differences between Kathmandu and Delhi.

The diplomatic challenge for Delhi is to prepare for that moment when it will have to step in to resolve the crisis in Nepal. India’s political leadership,including the current one,tends to ignore Nepal until a fleeting headache becomes an unbearable migraine.

For the moment,though,Delhi is staring at three possible futures in Kathmandu. Under the first,the current stalemate between the Maoists and the mainstream political parties will continue,and the present “caretaker government” will have no option but to govern for much longer than any one had anticipated.

Under the second scenario,the Maoists manage to draw a few more parliamentarians to its side,win the prime ministership and move quickly towards a one-party dictatorship. That the Maoists have not kept their word on giving up their instruments of coercion as part of the peace process is proof enough that their options are still open.

A third possibility is that Maoists will recognise — after seven inconclusive rounds of voting for a new prime minister — the importance of reassuring other political parties,giving up the instruments of violence,and joining the democratic process.

Delhi’s current diplomatic challenge is to prevent the second outcome and promote the third. There is no guarantee,however,that Delhi will succeed. To improve the chances of a peaceful resolution to the current deadlock,India must launch a sustained and intense engagement with all political parties in Nepal. While India cannot and should not write the script for that country’s political leaders,it must press vigorously for a political consensus in Kathmandu.

Delhi must also do its bit to make the international environment more favourable to the peace process. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) might have served as a valuable “Shikhandi” in the past,but it is no substitute to Delhi’s own consultations with the major powers.

India must also reach out to Beijing for a frank discussion on the political future of the Himalayan republic. Any settlement in Nepal that does not meet the interests of major powers,especially China,is unlikely to survive for too long. India must offer China a substantive dialogue on finding ways to stabilise their shared and turbulent periphery. Nepal might be a good place to start.

Finally,India must also encourage the Nepalese themselves to define a new vision for their nation. Situated between the world’s two fastest-growing economies,there is no reason for Nepal to remain one of the world’s poorest places.

If Kathmandu can produce a bit of political coherence at home and demonstrate a measure of economic purposefulness,Nepal can thrive as the Himalayan bridge between India and China.

raja.mohan@expressindia.com