Yin and Yang

As reported in this newspaper on Thursday, China8217;s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, has objected to India8217;s participation in the 8216;quadrilateral initiative8217; 8212; along with the US, Japan, and Australia. His Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee, replied that the exercise was not directed at Beijing. The diplomatic exchange underlines the enduring inequality in Sino-Indian relations. If Beijing has always had the political temerity to dictate diplomatic terms to New Delhi, India is too weighed down by strategic timidity to tell China to mind its own business. While New Delhi tends to be too unctuous in trying to prove its 8220;friendly credentials8221; in Beijing, China never thinks twice about pursuing its foreign policy goals at India8217;s expense.

Could anyone imagine an explanation from Beijing on why it had aligned with the 8216;imperialist8217; US during the 1970s and 1980s? Did India8217;s muted protests in the 1980s and 1990s stop China from supplying nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan? Improved relations between New Delhi and Beijing haven8217;t affected China8217;s condescension towards India. After assurances at the highest level that it would support New Delhi8217;s candidature for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Beijing sabotaged India8217;s campaign. After failing to prevent India8217;s membership of the East Asia Summit, China made sure all real decisions are taken in the ASEAN Plus Three, which excludes India. Nor does China seek India8217;s permission in exporting arms to our smaller neighbours or building strategic port facilities in Gwadar Pakistan, Chittagong Bangladesh, Sittwe Myanmar and Hambantota Sri Lanka.

Interestingly, communists in New Delhi have also begun to simulate outrage at the prospect of greater consultation and cooperation among Asia8217;s major democracies. The CPM, which objects so strenuously to American statements on India8217;s Iran policy, is now the first to demand a veto for Beijing on India8217;s policies towards the US and Japan. Think of the CPM8217;s anger if anyone in Washington had objected to India8217;s trilateral strategic dialogue with Russia and China. The CPM8217;s posturing on foreign policy autonomy seems to boil down to this 8212; India should play second fiddle to China in Asia. The national diplomatic goal is entirely different 8212; avoid an ideological foreign policy and reach out to the great powers in promoting India8217;s interests. That would demand a vigorous effort to elevate the quadrilateral dialogue with the US, Japan and Australia to the same level as its triangular engagement with Russia and China.