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The suggestion made by Kanwar Sandhu in his article. The Valley needs a Strategy' edit page, December 28 that we should have an institu...

The suggestion made by Kanwar Sandhu in his article. The Valley needs a Strategy8217; edit page, December 28 that we should have an institution for formulating a viable military strategy at the governmental level is welcome. Defence training establishments do not delve deeply in strategic aspects.There is, however, a major pitfall before such an institution can come into being. Primarily, our political leaders must formulate the political aims so that strategic issues can flow from them. The political leaders and the bureaucracy must also shed their fear of the armed forces. The fear that allowing defence services personnel to think strategically may create problems for them because the line between strategic thinking and higher political aims at the national level is indeed very thin.

For our commanders to think ahead and devise unorthodox plans as suggested by Kanwar Sandhu is easier said than done. Our entire strategic thinking is focused on a defensive posture. We think of surprise and an offensive onlywhen attacked. As commanders in Jamp;K, we planned to surprise the enemy in our occupation of defences mainly in the extent and strength and in limited offensive operations during hostilities. I suspect that Kanwar Sandhu suggests an element of surprise before the onset of a full-scale war or conflict. Our political and strategic aims have to be overhauled if we have to get our commanders to think in terms of such a strategic surprise.

Kanwar Sandhu is not right when he says that Pakistan chose the line of least expectation in Kargil to spring a surprise. Kargil has been in the midst of it all during 1947-48, 1965 and in 1971. If the usual SOPs had been followed and our intelligence set-up had worked, we would not have been surprised. 8220;Dislocation8221; per se cannot be one of the aims of strategy; it can be drawing out the enemy8217;s reserves if that can be termed as 8220;dislocation8221;. However, this lasts only until the end of the campaign as in the case of Kargil and not long term.

We certainly need to have astrategy not only for the Valley but also for the entire country. We displayed knee jerk reactions and bungled at Amritsar during the recent hijack. It is clear that we do not have a strategy at the national level to combat a crisis. The confusion in the thinking at the national level is clear from the fact that contradictory instructions were given to Amritsar by the Crisis Management Group CMG and the Principal Secretary to the PM. The CMG wanted to save the lives of the passengers at all costs while the Principal Secretary ordered whatever steps were necessary to prevent the aircraft from taking off Fly on the wall8217;, December 31. As Gurmeet Kanwal has said in his article Why India can8217;t intervene8217; edit page, December 31, we need to develop the capability to launch Special Forces quot;into action with the necessary strategic airlift, air defence and intelligence acquisition capability8221; within a specified time-frame.

It is of course one thing to raise Special Forces and quite another to actuallylaunch them into action without clear political and strategic aims. It is said that mobility is not in the tracks of the armoured tanks or the wheels of the vehicles or the feet of the soldier, but in the mind of the commander. Are the minds of our leadership strategically mobile?

The writer is a retired major general. Sharp responses and rejoinders to Express reports and analyses carried in this column will be paid for