Who lit the fire?

For soldiers in conflict zones and for civilians far away from them, the CBI8217;s decision to prosecute the five army officers allegedly involved in the Pathribal fake encounter is of far bigger import than indicated by the specifics of that awful tragedy. Soldiers should see it, first, as reaffirmation of something they are proud of 8212; they are a professional force defending a free society that puts no one above scrutiny. The prosecution is also a reaffirmation of something not universally acknowledged in the army as yet 8212; the conflation of kills and career prospects by some officers. As General Raghavan points out in his commentary on the op-ed page, this calls for a relook at the merit evaluation system. For civilians, that is, for society at large, the message is this: just how long did we think our armed forces would maintain their professional integrity when they have been used to put out so many fires over the decades?

Rhetoric about human rights violations by the army is ludicrous when it, typically, doesn8217;t account for the enormous pressure soldiers work under in situations of domestic conflict. The army is expected to routinely maintain norms that, if adhered to occasionally by members of the civilian administration, would generate admiring headlines. The police, the district administration, the politicians in conflict zones have all failed their duties repeatedly and many times grievously. The army doesn8217;t recruit its men and officers from a social vacuum. Yet vulnerable as they can be to the institutional corrosion that affects other parts of the establishment, they almost always behave because the army trains them to do so. This doesn8217;t mean the army gets a free pass to misconduct. But it does mean that when presented with a case such as the Pathribal killings we also need to ask why it is that in communal riots, the only peace multiplier is a column of army trucks.

Put it this way: the British army8217;s discipline cracked more than a few times when it was involved in Northern Ireland. In terms of size and complexity, the Indian army tackles the equivalent of half a dozen Northern Irelands. Some politicians have actually thought aloud about the army taking on the Naxalites as well. If civilian administrators continue to see the army as a default solution for the problems they create and/or can8217;t tackle, they should be ready for the possibility of the army becoming like them.