Those damned sceptical Germans

By happy accident,the German government recently played host to a gaggle of Brussels-based reporters. To judge from their comments,the charge that German leaders have turned nationalist seems overblown. Nor have Germanys rulers become Eurosceptic,exactly. But they are clearly fed up. And a fed-up Germany is not a minor political development in Europe.

The other message they wanted to broadcast is that rash steps such as explicitly turning monetary union into a transfer union in which the thrifty pay for the profligate could easily make German voters worryingly Eurosceptic. Senior figures point to weak support for the European project in lots of countries and No votes in various referendums. They note strong support for extreme nationalists in France,the Netherlands and Austria. Imagine if such parties emerged in Germany,they murmur.

Even if they are not nationalists in the flag-waving sense,German politicians now seem comfortable asserting Germanys national interests as the largest EU member and biggest net contributor to its budget. Until reunification,Germany was economically strong but politically weak,says Thomas de Maizière,the interior minister and a close ally of Mrs Merkels. This was convenient for other European countries,who grew used to Germany writing cheques. Todays Germany is ready to represent its interests with new vigour,just as France and Britain have for many years. Those interests include strict adherence to German law,the constitution and the EU treaties. If this slows decision-making,so be it. Germany resents being told to hurry up because the law does not matter or is trumped by politics.

Touring the halls of German power,the word culture comes up a lot,especially as in how European cultures differ over monetary stability,fiscal discipline and solidarity. In southern Europe,solidarity is measured in the billions sent by the EU to needy governments. To Germans,EU solidarity involves everyone doing their own homework. They leave little doubt as to which culture they consider superior. Pressed on Germanys role in delaying a bail-out for Greece for many weeks,officials retort that it took months for Greece to agree to credible conditions. It is like raising children,Mr de Maizière suggests: give in to demands too early,and it will be more expensive later,especially if giving in violates all your own principles.

Yet Germany too is guilty of incoherence. If euro-zone stability is so vital,why do German leaders alarm markets with statements about kicking rogue members out of the club,or unilateral actions such as banning naked short-selling? And why are they so shocked by calls for Germany to do more to boost demand at home? It would also help if German leaders made a more positive case for defending the euro zone,rather than the negative case for punishing speculators. One way to do this would be to state more explicitly that a bail-out for Greece is also a bail-out for German banks that hold lots of Greek bonds.

In defence of the fatherland

In Germanys defence,some other EU leaders are hardly helping. When Frances Nicolas Sarkozy crowed that the euro-zone rescue plan is 95 French,he was thinking of poll ratings at home,where voters like to hear that the French are running Europe. But this is a very dangerous strategy,says a politician from a third country,because it pushes Mrs Merkel into a corner.

Mr Sarkozy dreams of building a new power structure round the 16 euro-zone countries. But Mrs Merkel wants economic policy to be decided by all 27 EU members,precisely because she likes to balance Club Med members of the euro zone with more liberal countries,including Britain,Sweden,Denmark,the Czech Republic and Poland. Yet David Cameron,the British prime minister,is adamant that deeper economic co-ordination in Europe must affect only the 16. That may be savvy British politics,but it risks pushing Mrs Merkel into Frances arms.

In this euro crisis,Germanys leaders sound not so much indecisive as stuck. Their headache comes from trying to save the euro without enraging their voters. So far they have reacted with populist attacks on speculators and much angry rhetoric about discipline. But both approaches carry risks that they seem reluctant to acknowledge: that they may end up fuelling German voter rage as well as angering the rest of Europe.

Anger and denial are hardly surprising. Germans were promised that the single currency would be the old Deutschmark in new clothes,backed by Teutonic discipline and a fiercely independent central bank. Arguably,that fantasy Deutschmark died early on May 10th,when a euro-zone bail-out mechanism was agreed and the European Central Bank started buying government bonds by the bucketload. Germans are now in mourning. How they recover is not just their problem,but Europes.