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This is an archive article published on February 23, 2010

Mission Marja

It has been a long time since the Americans seemed in control in Afghanistan. But after an eventful week in Marja,it looks as if they have regained the initiative....

Any historian,or any general,would tell you the same: Lose the initiative on the battlefield,and its awfully hard to get it back. In the Korean War,the Americans lost the initiative in the beginning,took it back with a dramatic and daring operation,and then lost it again,finally fighting to a blood-soaked stalemate.

At Stalingrad,the Soviets took perhaps a million casualties,and inflicted nearly a million more,to wrest the initiative from Germany.

In 2007,in Iraq,the Americans gambled and,at great expense,regained a modicum of control over the course of events.

Here in Kabul,at the end of a long and eventful week,it is perhaps not unreasonable to pose the question: Have the Americans and their allies,at long last,regained the initiative in Afghanistan?

The past week offered a couple of large reasons to believe they had. In Marja in southern Afghanistan,15,000 American,Afghan and British troops pressed ahead with their biggest offensive of the war,aimed at expelling the Taliban from their largest Afghan sanctuary and installing something rarely seen here: a government that works.

Across the border,American and Pakistani officials confirmed the capture in Karachi of Abdul Ghani Baradar,the Talibans top military commander,the most significant blow to the Taliban leadership since 2001.

Its been a long time since the Americans seemed to be in the drivers seat here. So long that the history is worth recalling. Following the 9/11 attacks,the Americans blew into Afghanistan with force and savvy,knocking the Taliban and Al Qaeda off their feet and out of the Afghan capital. And then,remarkably,they threw the initiative away. Over the next five years,the Afghans,Americans and their NATO partners squandered their success by doing too little. The Afghan government,led by President Hamid Karzai,proved itself corrupt,incompetent and offensive to ordinary Afghans. America and its NATO partners fielded too few troops to keep the Taliban at bay; Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan went unmolested.

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The decisive turn came in summer 2006,when the insurgency exploded across southern and eastern Afghanistan,with depth and skill. It hasnt been the same since. By any measure,2009 was the most difficult and demoralising year.

The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely, Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn,the head of military intelligence,said in a briefing paper at years end. Twice as many American troops died in combat in 2009 as the year before.

Which brings us to now. The capture of Baradar,followed by the arrest of two Taliban shadow governors in another Pakistani city,suggested that the haven the insurgencys leaders have used for so long might not be so safe after all. If that proves true,the potential impacton Taliban operations,on the prospects for a negotiated peaceseemed enormous.

Still,it was the mission in Marja that seemed to bear the most potential,if only because in the end the wars outcome is going to be decided on Afghan ground. In Marja,the Americans,British and Afghans were implementing the ambitious new strategy championed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal,the top military commander.

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Under that plan,killing the insurgents in Marja figured as the least important part of the battle. What comes after the shooting,by General McChrystals account,is what matters most: building an Afghan government,police force and army that can keep the Taliban out after the fighting is over.

There are many reasons to believe that General McChrystals plan could work. Among his own forces,he has sharply curtailed the use of heavy firepower in order to spare Afghan civilians. He has stepped up the training and recruitment of the Afghan Army and police,to prepare for the day when the Americans and Europeans have left. In Marja,he has insisted that Afghans play a large role,putting more than five Afghan battalions in the field.

These days,the most troubling part of the Afghan project is not the conduct or determination of either the Americans or their NATO allies. The question,rather,is the Afghans themselves. For all the talk of the Marja operation being Afghan-led, the truth,from the get-go,was that it was a mostly American and British show and that the Afghans were playing a subordinate role. A week into the operation,the Americans and the British had lost 12 fighting men; the Afghans only three.

At a news conference on the battles third day,Gen. Sher Mohammed Zazai,the top Afghan field commander in the operation,gave an account of the fighting that contrasted almost entirely from that of the Americansand that appeared to be incorrect. We are not facing any threat now except in south Marja where there is a slight resistance,not enough to be an obstacle to our forces, General Zazai said.

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American officers had outlined the substantial resistance the Taliban were putting up in the centre of Marja and the north,not the south. A Times reporter,embedded with the Marines in northern Marja,reported fierce fighting. At weeks end,by all accounts,the Marja operation was going well. In Pakistan,Baradar was said to be talking. After four long years,the initiative,at least for now,had returned to the Americans.

But until the day arrives when the Afghans fully take the leaduntil,indeed,they push their allies out of the waythe initiative will be only that: American.

 

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