Ek wireless set ne 76 ko mara8217;

In this pitched and prolonged battle for physical domination of these tribal areas in Chhattisgarh,youth like Lakhma,who is the key person among the six arrested last week in connection with the attack,claim that they had to make the choice in favour of the Maoists. Many like him then form the jan militias,which then provides the numerical strength to any Maoist operation in which the core group of Maoists is relatively smaller. They also end up helping with logistics,supplies,liaising with villagers and other ancillary tasks like taking care of the injured in an operation. It is also people like him that the security forces nowadays target to turn them into special police officers and then act as informants against the Maoists.

Keeping Watch

Naxals get tip-off ABOUT CRPF exercise

On the morning of April 6,when almost an entire CRPF contingent of the 62nd Battalion was wiped out,Lakhma with a few others was on one of the hillocks. His main task was to spot reinforcements,hold them and alert the rest. He claims to have killed two CRPF men and that his group accounted for at least six to seven of the dead.

According to what Lakhma has told his interrogators,the planning for the whole operation started when the CRPF personnel arrived in the area on March 31. Pappa Rao,the main Maoist commander who planned and executed the attacks,reacted with caution when he heard the news. He was camped some 5 km inside the Chintalnar forest and getting this information,he ordered a close watch on the movements anticipating a major offensive.

GOING IN

FORCES not supposed to venture too far

At the same time,as officials are now trying to join the dots,the CRPF DIG of the area Nalin Prabhat - he has been moved out after the massacre was discussing plans with Dantewada SP Amaresh Mishra to deploy these forces on an area domination-cum-familiarisation exercise. The idea did not involve venturing too far inside the forest just visiting 8-10 villages on the way and returning after 48-72 hours. The route charted out was for them to enter from Tadmetla,move to Dornapal,touch Burkapal - the farthest point,about 7 km - and then return via Tongpali. The state police,in fact,wanted the contingent to venture a bit deeper,about 20 km,but Prabhat felt this was a good enough exercise before the major Naxal operation planned a few weeks later as there were credible inputs of Maoist presence in large numbers. The orders were to carry minimal supplies and stay in the forests as a measure to build endurance.

THE WRONG START

Contingent left late,lost wireless

But the execution was seemingly botched up right from the start and instead of leaving early morning on April 4,the contingent left only later in the day and by late afternoon had probably lost a wireless set. They apparently did not move further and stayed the night at nearby Mukhram village barely 3 km from the camp,where they asked for cots to be arranged,cooked food and mingled with the villagers. Lakhma has confirmed that this was duly reported back to Pappa Rao and a careful watch was kept on the group.

It was from here that word was sent back to the main camp near the road head,asking for another wireless set. The Inspector in-charge of the camp,who has now been transferred from there,duly obliged.

The next morning,according to Lakhma,the group moved around the area where the attack finally took place and appeared to be searching for something. This later turned out to be the missing wireless set,which the Naxals found,after the CRPF left the spot. While Lakhma claims that the set helped the Maoists in figuring out the subsequent movements of the contingent,senior officials feel that this may have not been the case even though the wireless set was in the possession of Rao by late afternoon.

THE GIVE AWAY

Did not return to camp,Naxals sure of their resuming search for wireless

Assuming that basic precautionary measures were taken to ensure that the missing wireless set did not catch subsequent conversations,the most telling give-away was when the group moved towards their camp but halted short of it in a school or ashram-like place very near the camp. The point,perhaps,was to not log in their return else the details would have to be reported up the hierarchy. This possibly led the Maoists to conclude that the group would surely return in the morning to resume the search for the wireless set.

While at this school,violations occurred again when provisions were delivered from the camp to make the night stay a bit more convenient. By then,the original plan as it had been conceived,had been thrown to the winds and the group was showing unusual behaviour that caught the eye of the Naxals.

Convinced that the group would return in the morning,Lakhma has told in his interrogation that Rao passed orders for additional support from other Naxal commanders besides asking more jan militia to be arranged for support. Between 8 and 8-30 pm on April 5 night,Lakhma has confirmed that some 200-300 militia men had been deployed and he was given the charge of a hillock to keep an eye on reinforcements. Mines had been laid beyond Chintalnar,anticipating reinforcements from the next camp in Chintalgufa. While the reinforcements came from Chintalgufa on foot,a vehicle from the camp soon after the attack started,overshot the location and became the target of that mine.

MOVING IN FOR THE KILL

Naxals allow rested and relaxed CRPF men to enter without arousing suspicion

According to Lakhma,he like other militia men had a muzzle-loading rifle - militia men are not trained for anything more and in any such attack,the core Naxal group at the most would have 20-odd AK-47s - but there were several grenades which were lobbed and these caused most of the injuries. He confirmed that mines had been placed in tiffins,but only on the possible exit routes. However,these mines were not even needed because there was hardly any chance to escape. The police later recovered about 10 unexploded grenades and these tiffin mines.

The Maoists waited through the night according to Lakhma,and instructions were given that the CRPF should be allowed to enter the area without arousing any suspicion. Maoists have divided the region into three divisions - South Bastar,Darbha and West Bastar. Lakhma has told interrogators that Ravi,who is in-charge of South Bastar and Surendra,who is responsible for Darbha,were also involved in the attack.

When the CRPF men entered the place,Lakhma has revealed that quite a few of them took rest and relaxed while some others searched for the wireless set. At an opportune moment,the signal was given and the attack launched. He confirms that eight Naxals were also killed in the attack while six were injured. One of the injured was apparently from his village. After the carnage,he recalls that the Naxal commanders told the local militia to gather all weapons and ammunition while scores of others were also called in to help the injured and mop up. The other five arrested with Lakhma were involved in the mopping up effort.

After the attack,Lakhma has stated that Pappa Rao ordered for celebrations but before that there was a wreath laying ceremony for the eight who had died. Rao apparently stayed in one of the nearby villages for over a day before leaving the area. Going by Lakhmas account and tallying it with internal investigations,sources say,the actual orders were never followed and the CRPF team never took the decided route. The relentless search for the wireless set coupled with the urge to stay as close as possible to their camp and hence,move around only in the nearby area,gave Naxals a chance to lay the trap. For Lakhma,the explanation is very simple: Ek wireless set ne 76 ko mara One wireless set killed 76.