A chillier peace

The Godfather,the fictional Mafia supremo,advised that one should hold friends close but enemies closer.

The Godfather,the fictional Mafia supremo,advised that one should hold friends close but enemies closer. Thirty years ago,after three decades of on-and-off war,Egypt and Israel chose to heed this advice and sign a peace treaty. Though severely and repeatedly strained,the deal has come to be taken for granted as a linchpin of the fragile Middle Eastern order. But new stresses may test neighbourly relations as never before.

The peace has always had its critics: an Egyptian president,Anwar Sadat,paid with his life for supporting it. Nowadays sceptics on both sides are no longer seen as marginal fanatics. In the haggling to form a new Israeli cabinet after the election in February,Binyamin Netanyahu,the hawkish right-winger who is set to become prime minister,has conceded the post of foreign minister to the even less placatory Avigdor Lieberman. Mr Lieberman has in the past averred that Egypt is plotting a surprise attack on Israel,in the event of war recommended bombing the Aswan dam and said that Egypt8217;s president,Hosni Mubarak,could 8220;go to hell8221; for his refusal to visit Israel. Such sayings have not endeared him to Egyptians,already appalled by the recent wars waged by supposedly milder Israeli governments in Lebanon and Gaza.

Inside Egypt,meanwhile,the 80-year-old Mr Mubarak8217;s opponents have mounted a surprisingly effective campaign to challenge the countries8217; main commercial agreement. Signed in 2005,it commits Egypt to export natural gas to Israel. Critics,who say the gas is underpriced and has helped Israel wage war on Palestinians,have won court rulings in their favour. The government has so far blocked their implementation,arguing that it does not sell gas to Israel but rather to a private Egyptian-Israeli firm that just happens to be largely owned by businessmen linked to both countries8217; intelligence services. But pressure is mounting for a fuller accounting.

Such unusually strong ripples of dissent reflect the region-wide opprobrium that has washed over Mr Mubarak since he refused to break Israel8217;s siege of Gaza by opening Egypt8217;s own border with the battered Palestinian territory. Such waves have buffeted Egypt8217;s leaders each time their old Zionist enemy has lashed out at fellow Arabs,beginning with its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. But as Israel looks uglier than ever to the Arab street,and as Israel8217;s foes such as Hamas in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon look more heroic,Egypt8217;s ageing leader looks more exposed.

At the same time,the United States,which underwrote the peace agreement of 1979 with generous aid,has lost influence. At first,American aid accounted for nearly 10 per cent of both countries8217; GDP. Now it amounts to under 1 per cent of Egypt8217;s and under 2 per cent of Israel8217;s. Still,reliance on American equipment means that both countries8217; armies depend on the superpower. Despite the braggadocio of Israel8217;s politicians and burning Arab resentment,neither Israelis nor Egyptians desire a return to war. But as Egypt8217;s regime may be nearing a change at the helm and Israelis lose hope of ever gaining acceptance in the Arab world,the cold peace between them may drift towards something more like a cold war.

The Economist Newspaper Limited 2009