Turning Bangla migrants into partners in growth

The relationship between Bangla-desh and India has become a sorry tale of mutual incomprehension, fragile egos and self defeating behaviour....

The relationship between Bangla-desh and India has become a sorry tale of mutual incomprehension, fragile egos and self defeating behaviour. The sum total of Indian understanding on the issue oscillates between two propositions. We are the big power of the region and are therefore the objects of envy and fear. The second proposition turns on attributing straightforward maliciousness and conspiratorial intent. On this story: Bangladesh is becoming a frontline jihadi state as part of a plot to do India in.

Bangladesh for its part seems to be in denial that India has some genuine cause for concern. Juxtaposing the Bangladesh and the Indian press is a revealing exercise. The former will lead you to believe that there is no anti-India activity from Bangladesh soil. The BSF8217;s attempts to turn back migrants is nothing more than an Indian attempt to push back Indian Muslims into Bangladesh, a plot that the valiant BDR is trying to foil. Reading the Indian press you get the impression that Bangladesh is swarming with anti-India activity and the source of a swelling tide of migrants that will overrun India.

What is the way out of mutual incomprehension? India has to begin by recognising that as the dominant power it will have to go the extra mile to accommodate Bangladesh. This means at the very least three things. First, there is a sad joke that goes to the effect that India gets into diplomatic trouble when it tries to be kind to its neighbours. This is because our kindness is allied with condescension. We lost a good political capital by endlessly harping on India8217;s role in the creation of Bangladesh and making it appear as if the Bangladeshis had no agency of their own. Second, if India wants to be a big power it should act like one. We ought not to make relatively small issues a matter for hard-nosed bargaining. On issues of market access and reducing the barriers for Bangladeshi goods, India ought to give as many unilateral concessions as possible. These issues have now been subsumed under a broad discussion of a Free Trade Agreement with Bangladesh, but progress on this agreement has been slow.

India should jettison the illusion that pressure tactics will work with Bangladesh. Pressure tactics backfire when applied to anxious nations. They will simply produce a counter cycle of more entrenched hostility. One of the lessons of the twentieth century is that even weak nations have the power to inflict enormous damage on powerful ones, and the last thing we need is a sense within Bangladesh that it is being pushed to the wall. Such a syndrome will only produce the kind of anarchic violence that is so easy to produce in South Asia.

Only carrots, not sticks are likely to work. And we have to imaginatively think about what those carrots are. An agreement with Bangladesh on solving the issue of enclaves, and providing corridors to Bangladesh was reached in 1974, but we have used every juridical and procedural tactic to ensure that its operation on the ground remains fuzzy. Part of the difficulty is that we are a big power without a big power knowledge base. How many academics and scholars in India can give you a serious and analytically plausible account of the incentives politicians in Bangladesh operate under?

Bangladesh, for its part, needs to come to terms with what kind of nation it wants to become. Bangladeshi society is undergoing a critical transformation. On the one hand, its economy and social sector have done interestingly well over the last few years. On the other hand, its political system remains hostage to deep divisions that are potentially fertile ground for an assortment of radical parties and groups. There is little India can do to directly intercede in this process. But it will not help India to characterise Bangladeshi politics as a vast conspiracy against us, especially when its victims are most likely to be other Bangladeshis. Equally, it will not help Bangladesh to fan the flames of a volatile mix by resenting India for everything, from harbouring Taslima Nasreen to salination in its coastal territories, and by baiting India by providing assistance to militant groups of Indian origin.

Even if Bangladesh8217;s grievances against Indian high-handedness are justified, it is more likely to serve its own cause by not provoking India. There is something myopic about a nation that will not trade natural gas with its most lucrative market because it bears a grudge. Bangladesh8217;s elites will have to decide the extent to which they would like to keep their own country hostage.

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Cross-border movement of migrants will remain a contentious issue. But if Bangladesh is in a state of denial over whether this issue exists, India is in a state of denial in supposing that there can be a simple fencing solution to the problem. We actually do not and cannot repatriate large numbers of Bangladeshis, but the constant threats to do so undermine any mutual relationship. The more intelligent strategy will be to manage migration, through schemes like guest worker programmes, and by making sure that these migrants are not instruments of political power in the States where they receive employment.

Manmohan Singh was correct to resist the hardliners in his own party and offer an unconditional relief package for Bangladesh. Whether such gestures will be enough to break the vicious cycle of mutual incomprehension remains to be seen. But we have no option but to extend our imaginations beyond the pinched borders to which they have been confined.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research. The views expressed are personal