The war that was won from above

TV Images have shown large columns of Coalition tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers moving ahead, nose to tail, en route to Nassiriya, Bag...

TV Images have shown large columns of Coalition tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers moving ahead, nose to tail, en route to Nassiriya, Baghdad, Al Kut etc. It was a forbidding sight but was possible only because there was no air power that Iraq could bring to bear on coalition forces. The fact is that, prior to the outbreak of war, the Iraqi Air Force had already lost its teeth. At the commencement of war, the command and control set-up, the radar and missile sites were hit, rendering Iraqi Air Force non-operational except for some ground-based Air Defence elements.

Without any air threat to supply lines, coalition armies could move forward at speed. Interdiction of the lines of communication is an Air Force task that yields best dividends for the air effort employed in support of the ground troops. Also, equally importantly, any ground threat to the lines of communication, could be readily seen and attacked from the air. This was done. Therefore, the hiatus in the advance of the coalition forces was, inter alia, due to supply lines being over-stretched, than any Iraqi attack.

Again, the Apache and other helicopter units were brought very close to the combat area. This facilitated quick reaction times but would have been foolhardy had the Iraqi Air Force been operational. No Iraqi air power also permitted carefree paratrooping of forces in Northern Iraq.

Besides, occupation of Baghdad airport, bringing in reinforcements including air-landing supplies, and the mere defence of the airport could have resulted in many casualties. Many other instances can be quoted. The essential point is that the absence of any Iraqi air power and the considerable disadvantage, indeed handicap, that they had to contend with proved yet again the overriding requirement to win the air war at the outset of the conflict.

The means available for reconnaissance, in all meanings of the word, were considerable and permitted detailed, accurate information on targets, by day or night. Even then, corroboration was necessary at times and this was provided by human intelligence. The US practiced what has come to be known as 8216;8216;Network Centric Warfare8217;8217;, implying that a composite picture of the battle area incorporating 8216;8216;information8217;8217; from all sensors and sources was available wherever required. Thereafter, the weapons inventory of the US Air Force permitted selection of the appropriate weapon for the target or target system. The strategy of 8216;8216;shock and awe8217;8217; was based on punishing attacks from the air against a number of targets ranging from Presidential palaces to government buildings including Armed Forces HQ, economic targets, as well as direct attacks on Armed Forces targets, whether static or deployed. Such attacks were to be mounted all over the country with particular attention to Baghdad. The air attacks were to be coupled with rapid movement of ground forces. Due to reasons that could form the subject of another story, the strategy did not work as planned. However, the air attacks went as planned and were delivered with accuracy and lethality as expected.

Much has been written about the fact that the Republican Guards did not put up a fight to the finish. It is opined that this was largely due to very heavy concentrated air attacks on the Guards, reducing their operational potential to a degree where they could not operate as a cohesive force. Ground forces concentrated in the open are very vulnerable to air attacks. This is particularly true over open desert terrain that offers little natural camouflage.

Finally, air power was used effectively in direct support of the ground forces. The integrated operations were successful as targets could be readily acquired, the aids available were able to differentiate friend from foe except in very few cases, the weapons used were highly accurate, the coalition dominated the skies, and also because the opposition was outclassed in every sense of the word.

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Direct and close support was also provided to coalition armour during their forays into towns and cities. Once again, the wide expanses as opposed to narrow areas in the cities, where the forays operated, allowed to carry out effective armed surveillance. Notwithstanding the successes, in some reports it has been stated that as many as 20 helicopters were seriously damaged whilst engaged in direct close support. This is probable given the altitude, and the low speed and consequent vulnerability of helicopters. There are many lessons to be learnt from the air operations, not the least of them being that only some of them are applicable in our context.

The writer is a retired Air Marshal