The safety imperative

Every MiG-21 that now crashes makes it more difficult for this aircraft to rid itself of the simplistic but grossly erroneous epithet of 1...

Every MiG-21 that now crashes makes it more difficult for this aircraft to rid itself of the simplistic but grossly erroneous epithet of 8216;flying coffin8217;. What is worse, an objective approach to aircraft accidents and flight safety has been made more difficult by this perception. There can be no doubt in anyone8217;s mind that aircraft accidents must be reduced to the irreducible minimum level possible. Prevention lies in investigating every single accident in the context of the larger trends and instituting remedial measures. As regards trends, the record tells us that the Indian Air Force used to lose, on an average, around 40 aircraft per year in the 1960s, and this had come down to an average of 30 per year by the 1980s. As per the parliamentary committee8217;s report, the average loss during the 1990s was 22 8212; ie, nearly half the loss rate of the 1960s in spite of the fact that the IAF today is flying a much greater proportion of older aircraft than it did in the 1960s. This itself indicates that there is a great deal of scope for further reduction of accidents.

By any standards, the overall trend in accident prevention in the air force indicates a most creditable performance which often gets ignored. Modern technology has certainly helped; and the lower accident rate on Mirage-2000, MiG-29 and Jaguars is proof enough of this. Unfortunately, decline in defence spending from 3.6 per cent in mid-1980s to 2.1 per cent by 1996-97 foreclosed options to modernise the air force. But there are also problems with quality control during manufacture, overhaul and field maintenance, which need urgent attention. The Public Accounts Committee has acknowledged that quality control on spares and components has been compromised during the past decade. Fighter aircraft engines 8212; the apparent reason for the crash over Jalandhar 8212; do not fail without a cause, which goes back to either design weakness, manufacturing defect or maintenance lapses. Much of the engine8217;s critical components remain sealed at the time of manufacture and overhaul. Frequent incidence of engine failure requires a deeper probe. And it is good that the IAF has suspended flying on aircraft fitted with engines similar to that which failed after take-off on Friday.

The fact that 44 per cent of the accidents are caused by technical defects and failures points to the potential advantages of improving quality control. The issue has, sadly, been mired in the HAL vs IAF debate, prominently surfacing in the PAC report as well. It is time that the quality control organisation for aircraft manufacture and overhaul is brought directly under the Inspector General Flight Safety 8212; and his organisation preferably moved under the defence minister. Linked to the question of quality control is the issue of accountability for technical failures. For example, warranty for newly manufactured and overhauled systems is an essential element of that quality control and accountability. The IAF has been seeking this since 1978 and the government seems unable to resolve this basic issue in spite of the fact that the matter essentially rests within the same ministry. There is no moral, operational or financial justification for the manufacturer and overhaul agency not providing requisite warranty, a provision that we all seek at our individual level when buying even a cooking stove.