The new new world order

It is too soon to tell whether Washington8217;s moves to bring Beijing and New Delhi into the great-power concert will succeed. Any attempt to boost the standing of rising states within international organisations will cost other countries some of their influence in those forums.

The Bush administration8217;s unilateralist impulses, on vivid display in Iraq, have become a lightning rod for criticism of US foreign policy. But they have overshadowed a more pragmatic and multilateral component of the Bush administration8217;s grand strategy: Washington8217;s reconfiguration of US foreign policy and international institutions to account for shifts in the global distribution of power away from Europe and towards Asia. Because these efforts have focused more on so-called low politics than on the global war on terrorism, they have flown under the radar. But in fact, George W. Bush has revived his father8217;s call for a 8216;new world order8217; 8212; by creating, in effect, a new new world order.

Beyond pre-emption and the global war on terror, another key element of Bush8217;s national security strategy has been to institutionalise a new great-power concert. This is consistent with Washington8217;s view of multilateralism: strictly a means to further US ends. So, the Bush administration defers to institutions it sees as being effective say, the WTO. But it scorns multilateral institutions that fail to live up to their own stated standards various other UN bodies.

A few years ago, the Bush team started to reallocate resources within the US government 8212; most significantly in the reallocation of its diplomats away from Cold War stalwarts in Europe and towards emerging nations such as Brazil, China, and India. More recently, it has spearheaded multilateral efforts to integrate China and India into important international regimes, bolstering their profiles in forums ranging from the International Monetary Fund to the World Health Organisation, on issues as diverse as nuclear proliferation, monetary relations, and the environment.

Washington has also strengthened its bilateral relationships with China and India. After an awkward beginning 8212; the spy plane crash of early 2001 8212; the Bush administration reoriented its approach to Beijing. 8220;It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China8217;s membership into the international system,8221; then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick announced in September 2005. 8220;We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system8221; so that it will 8220;work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.8221; The 8216;responsible stakeholder8217; language has since become part of all official US pronouncements on China, and the theory behind it has guided several initiatives.

The United States has reached out to India as well. Even though Pakistan is a significant US ally in the war on terrorism, the US-Indian relationship has warmed considerably over the past five years, exemplified by the recent conclusion of a bilateral agreement to cooperate on civilian nuclear energy 8212; a de facto recognition by the United States that India is a nuclear power.

It is too soon to tell whether Washington8217;s moves to bring Beijing and New Delhi into the great-power concert will succeed. Power is a zero-sum game, and so any attempt to boost the standing of China, India and other rising states within international organisations will cost other countries some of their influence in those forums. These prospective losers can be expected to stall or sabotage attempts at reform. Having been endowed with privileged positions in many key postwar institutions, European countries stand to lose the most, and smaller developing countries can be expected to back Europe in resisting US-led reform efforts so as not to lose what little influence they currently have. The Bush administration8217;s past actions will also haunt this future endeavour: many countries and even more citizens will doubt Washington8217;s motives and view reform efforts as opportunistic attempts to free itself from the strictures of multilateralism.

It may seem odd for the United States to try to disenfranchise its traditional European allies in order to reward governments with more troublesome agendas. But success will bring ascendant states recognition and legitimacy to match their new power. In return, they will have to accept a multilateral order built on US principles. But they 8212; especially China and India 8212; have grown phenomenally by doing just that. Now that they are concerned with sustaining their current high rates of economic growth, emerging powers share some interests with the United States on issues such as the security of energy supplies and the prevention of global pandemics. Furthermore, if these countries are not integrated, they might go it alone and create international organisations that fundamentally clash with US interests. If India and China are not made to feel like co-managers of the international system, they could make the future very uncomfortable for the United States.

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Bringing China and India into the concert of great powers without alienating the EU or its members will require prodigious amounts of diplomatic will and skill as recent trade and security disputes with Beijing suggest. Nevertheless, the Bush administration has gotten off to a solid start. As it proceeds, its task is simple to articulate but hard to execute: keep the United States8217; old friends close and its new friends closer.

The writer is associate professor of international politics at Tufts University8217;s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the author of 8216;All Politics Is Global8217; This article first appeared in the March/April issue of 8216;Foreign Affairs8217;