The Aid Syndrome

Pakistan has received aid packages similar to the one promised at Camp David over the last fifty years. Between 1951 and 1981, the United States provided $5 billion in direct economic assistance to Pakistan. General Zia ul Haq negotiated $3.2 billion in aid for 1981-85 and another $4 billion for the subsequent six years, in return for Pakistan’s involvement in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States has also been supportive of Pakistan’s efforts at securing funding from international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank. IFI support for Pakistan averages $2 billion per year. Constant conflict, internal as well as regional and the absence of rule of law has often mitigated the benefits of these concessional flows of resources into Pakistan.

At Camp David, President Bush praised General Musharraf for being a key ally in the global war against terrorism. Missing from Bush’s comments was the slightest hint of concern over stifling democracy and allowing Pakistan’s Islamist extremists a free hand. Such unconditional US support has encouraged previous Pakistani military rulers to pursue disastrous regional adventures, such as support for anti-India militancy, and has done little to move the country towards democracy. If the US really wants to help Pakistan overcome its status as a troubled state, backing for General Musharraf must be tempered with clear indications that Washington is uneasy with the domestic and regional policies of South Asia’s troubled nuclear-armed state.

President Bush’s handling of General Musharraf could be a test of the promise he made just before the war in Iraq about bringing democracy to the Muslim world. Last week, General Musharraf declared his intention to indefinitely remain at the helm of Pakistan’s affairs because in his view ‘‘Pakistan is not ready for democracy’’. This view contradicts President Bush’s stated interest in the spread of democratic values. In February, Bush had described as ‘‘presumptuous and insulting’’ any suggestion that democracy is unsuited to the Muslim world or that freedom and democracy may not have appeal for certain peoples for cultural reasons. So far the US seems content to allow General Musharraf and Pakistan’s all-powerful military and intelligence services to run the country’s affairs. General Musharraf refuses to restore the country’s constitution, offers only limited powers to the parliament elected last October and has calibrated cooperation in the war against terrorism to extract maximum benefit from Washington. He has gone on record to suggest that he sees US aid as ‘‘reward’’ for Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism.

Pakistan’s support in tracking down Al-Qaeda members has undoubtedly been valuable to the US. But the country’s intelligence services, notorious for their efficiency in dealing with domestic dissidents, seem to be doling out Al-Qaeda figures one at a time as if to keep the US indefinitely dependent on their support. A major Al-Qaeda personality has been arrested and handed over to the US before every important meeting between Pakistani and American officials. This has led cynics to ask whether the timing of these arrests is a coincidence or the result of a deliberate effort to establish Pakistan’s usefulness to the United States for a long time to come. General Musharraf claimed that the corruption and incompetence of civilian leaders had forced his hand when he overthrew an elected government and assumed power in a military coup in 1999. He promised to restore democracy in the shortest possible time when he faced international condemnation and American sanctions for imposing military rule. As democracy-related criticism and sanctions gave way to praise for General Musharraf’s support in the war effort, his rhetoric about a phased transition to democracy has been substituted by comments about his being indispensable for Pakistan.

Pakistan became a nuclear power when it tested its nuclear weapons soon after India’s nuclear tests in 1998. General Musharraf has suppressed secular political parties, paving the way for the rise of Islamists who now wield considerable political weight. This enables him to claim that the only alternative to his military regime is an Islamist one. Since the US does not want Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to fall under the control of Islamists, the military’s domination of politics is allowed to persist.

The lack of public criticism or serious private remonstrations by the US have encouraged General Musharraf to follow a two-track approach in relations with Pakistan’s nuclear rival and neighbour, India. Pakistani support for Islamic militants in the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir has brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war several times in the last two years. US intervention was required each time to avert war. Recently, the two countries exchanged ambassadors and revived transport links, based on General Musharraf’s promise to permanently cease support for the Kashmiri militants. India’s hardliners are partly to blame for the almost constant state of conflict between the two South Asian neighbours. But the militants in Kashmir also remain active and General Musharraf recently again stepped up his confrontational rhetoric against India. Without US pressure, Musharraf and his fellow oligarchs are unlikely to keep their promises about democracy and normalisation of relations with India.

The US is giving priority to its strategic needs of the moment, just as it did during the cold war and during the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. Then, Washington supported military rulers in Pakistan, allowing their liberalised authoritarianism to pass for phased democratisation and ignoring Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program despite publicly denouncing it. As a result, Pakistan failed to evolve a viable political system and India-Pakistan relations deteriorated. This time, the US should not allow a repetition of that pattern. Military rule or Islamist domination is not Pakistan’s only choice. Pakistan can, and should, be a constitutional democracy like its neighbours in South Asia, and the US should make clear its preference for that outcome.

(The author is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He served as adviser to Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka)