
There are new and welcome signs of a shift in the US administration8217;s approach towards India8217;s nuclear and missile programmes. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott appears to favour the early lifting of economic sanctions without making India8217;s signature on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT a precondition for that step. If this view prevails in the US government it will enable Atal Behari Vajpayee to make better progress on domestic consensus-building on the CTBT. His government will no longer be seen by critics as acting under external pressure and he can confidently proceed towards signing the treaty in the knowledge that such a step will further India8217;s own security interests and global non-proliferation. Meanwhile, Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, has expressed the sound view that Washington8217;s relations in the region should not be defined by a single-issue agenda. Both messages were delivered in the course of separate foreign policy speeches inWashington.
There is definitely a sea-change in the language of administration officials. But it would be most unwise to interpret it as a sign of a fundamental change in Washington8217;s non-proliferation agenda or anything like a move towards recognising India8217;s nuclear weapons power status. As President Clinton said in his state of the union address, he intends to make every effort to restrain India and Pakistan8217;s nuclear and missile programmes. At the same time, the Talbott-Inderfurth statements cannot be seen merely as attempts to improve the negotiating climate in advance of talks which Talbott is scheduled to hold next month in New Delhi and Islamabad. Washington appears to be taking a longer view of things and to understand better today than it did a few months ago that a nation8217;s security is inextricably linked with its economic well-being and the development of healthy external relations. On this matter, India and the US should be in complete accord. New Delhi has been insisting all along thatmonomania is self-defeating and that a sanctions policy is unworkable and may even be counterproductive. It cannot but welcome the shift in emphasis in Washington.
Cultivating relations in South Asia across a broad political and economic canvas is seen in Washington as being productive in two ways. Engaging more closely with India and Pakistan will enable the Clinton Administration to address its non-proliferation concerns even as it helps to improve the security environment and security perceptions in the two countries. As long as this also means that non-proliferation is understood as a universal goal and is not selectively applied to some countries, India must welcome the new approach. Whether sanctions can indeed be lifted early and permanently will depend to a great extent on the US Congress which has so far given Clinton only a one-year waiver. It is clear that official efforts to explain the administration8217;s South Asia policy are intended to make hardliners see things differently and persuade themthat a one-point agenda cannot and will not work.