Strategic Stance

Most commentators are so shocked at the coup in Pakistan that they have ignored the manner in which Sharif had come to manipulate the defence services. This is what makes this coup different from the earlier ones in Pakistan. Unlike all previous military take-overs, General Musharraf turned the tables on the prime minister after the latter had not only sacked him, but tried to upset the entire top defence hierarchy.

This is not to suggest that the General was right in displacing a politically electedgovernment. It is only to emphasise the point that tempering with the internal mechanism of the military could have serious repercussions. Should the military react, as it in Pakistan, democratic functioning becomes a victim. If the services quietly acquiesce, there is the risk of demoralisation setting in the rank and file of the services.

Nawaz Sharif had sacked the previous Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat last year to bring in General Musharraf, superseding a few officers in the process. Two weeks before the coup, Sharif had retired the naval chief, and then he sought to bring in General Khwaja Ziauddin in place of General Musharraf. It is obvious that had the move succeeded, some other changes would have followed at the level of the Chief of General Staff and the corps commanders.

Whatever may have been his compulsions in bringing about these changes, bringing in political favourites in top positions of a professional army is beset with serious consequences, as we discovered during the 1962debacle with China. Lt. Gen. (Dr.) M.L. Chibber (Retd) in his excellent treatise Military Coup feels that the best way to ensure civilian control is to provide internal corporate autonomy to the armed forces.

Though comparisons are odious, particularly given the peculiarity of every country, I am not sure how any professional army in the world would take interference in its functioning. Even replacement of one odd senior commander usually raises heckles. Recently, soon after the Kosovo operation, when the NATO commander General Wesley Clark was replaced by General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the event did not go unnoticed. Back home, irrespective of the merits of the case, the sacking of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat from the post of the Chief of Naval Staff sent shockwaves within the services.

The question has often been raised on how Indian and Pakistani armies have chosen different paths after Partition, with Pakistan taking to praetorianism repeatedly. Whether by coincidenceor otherwise, the countries where military has intervened repeatedly have either an Islamic or a Latin American heritage.

Unlike in Pakistan, in India the civil-military relations are evolving. Moreover, the unique multilingual and multiethnic composition of the Indian Army has helped keep it on a linear path. The complicated command structure of the Indian Army (unlike in Pakistan, which has the Corps commanders reporting directly to the Army Chief) and the professional manner in which troop deployment has been undertaken are other factors which have kept the military content with its role and out of politics.

At the same time, while Pakistan has to worry about keeping its army in check, the erosion of military values and professionalism should be a cause of concern in India. The increasing use of the Army as police constabulary goes against the ethos of the services. Sadly, of late, there have been instances of political interference and subjectivity in certain army promotions based on casteconsiderations, which need to be checked.

To withstand all such pressures, we need a high degree of professionalism. As Samuel P Huntington stated in his book Soldier and the State, the higher the degree of professionalism of the officer corps and the larger its corporate autonomy, the smaller the chances of their intervening in the country’s politics.

There is also an urgent need for creating a vibrant national security apparatus. This will enable the services to project their viewpoint and perspective on matters of national security interest, which they are called upon to unhold. Apparently, this was one of the areas which widened the rift between the government and the military in Pakistan. So far the system in India is heavily dependent on personal equations between the top political and military heads, rather than professional advice meted out in well-defined forums. Whenever there was a crack between the two (like in 1962), a military debacle followed. When the equation between the two was good(1971 was an excellent example), there was a military success.

Instead of sitting smug over the developments in our neighbourhood and reassuring ourselves on the apolitical nature of our services, we should not only value the services’ internal autonomy but work towards a viable civil-military relationship.