Sonia146;s choice

Rajiv Gandhi8217;s decision to make India a nuclear-weapon state was a painful one taken after four years of agonising. It was a lonely one. He might have informally consulted R. Venkataraman and P.V. Narasimha Rao who were the two in the know on the weapon research effort during Indira Gandhi8217;s days. But the decision was his alone. The cabinet was not in it, nor the party. Nuclear decisions all over the world were lonely ones and submitted to legislatures and parties for debate post facto. So it was when Atal Bihari Vajpayee took the decision to conduct the Shakti tests. When such decisions are taken by leaders the legislatures and parties usually accept them. Only leaders who have the confidence to carry the party and legislatures usually take such decisions.

The nuclear weapon effort is Rajiv8217;s legacy. He initiated it after a lot of agonising. I am personally aware of it since I had argued with him on that issue for almost a year in 1985. He appointed an inter-disciplinary group under his chairmanship to debate the nuclear issue. It had as members chief ministers Karunakaran and Saikia, Arun Singh, the cabinet secretary, the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, two intelligence chiefs, Raja Ramanna, Bimal Jalan, the chief economic advisor and R.K. Khandelwal, chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, as secretary. I was the only person from outside the government. I was the most vocal advocate for India going nuclear. Many others were on my side but chose to keep somewhat muted.

Rajiv was clearly unhappy about India going nuclear. At one point, he asked if India could not offer a revised, non-discriminatory, draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was not a believer in the Western nuclear strategy and nuclear war-fighting. But I argued that nuclear weapons were the currency of power in that world and India needed them for its security and strategic autonomy. After several sessions of arguments spread over months he directed that a study be conducted on the cost of going nuclear. A committee under General Sundarji, with R. Chidambaram, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Vice-Admiral Nayyar and Air-Marshal Johnny Greene went into the issue and came up with the report that at a cost of Rs 7000 crore at 1985 prices and over seven years time a credible minimum deterrent of 100 warheads and 100 missiles could be produced. After this report was submitted there were no more meetings of the interdisciplinary group.

But it was obvious that Rajiv was against going nuclear. In 1986, he distanced himself from Ramanna and rejected his recommendation to appoint P.K. Iyengar, a weapon scientist, as his successor. He chose M.R. Srinivasan, a reactor engineer, as the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He initiated negotiations on the Kudankulam reactors. He joined Mikhail Gorbachev in issuing the Delhi declaration on a nuclear-weapon free, nonviolent world. He persisted in this policy though Pakistan had publicly boasted about its nuclear weapon and threatened India during Operation Brasstacks.

Rajiv Gandhi presented his action plan for disarmament to the UN General Assembly on June 9, 1988, in which he fervently pleaded for global disarmament. He offered that India would not go nuclear if the world were to accept his phased disarmament plan. He asked them to negotiate a new non-discriminatory NPT. He also issued a veiled warning. He said, 8220;Left to ourselves we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when tactical considerations, in the play of great power rivalry, are allowed to take precedence over the imperative of non-proliferation, with what leeway are we left?8221;

Rajiv Gandhi8217;s pleas were totally ignored. After another eight or nine months of agonising, he put India8217;s security and interests ahead of all other considerations and directed the weaponisation of the Indian nuclear programme. It could not have been an easy decision for him. But Indian security came first. Today, senior US statesmen like George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn invoke the words of Rajiv Gandhi to derive support for their campaign for a nuclear-weapon free world, some 19 years after Rajiv Gandhi vainly pleaded for nuclear disarmament.

He envisaged Kudankulam as the beginning of collaboration with foreign countries for rapid expansion of our civil nuclear programme. While the credit for conducting the tests may go to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the father of both the military nuclear progamme and the renewal of foreign civil nuclear cooperation is Rajiv Gandhi. It should not be forgotten either that the first Indo-US military technical cooperation agreement was also initiated by him.

People all over the country understand that the decision on nurturing Rajiv Gandhi8217;s legacy of the nuclear issue rests wholly with Sonia Gandhi. Manmohan Singh would have gone ahead with it on his own. She should now listen to her inner voice and not depend upon the advice of her veteran party advisors. It will not be to her credit or to the long-term credibility of her party if Dr Singh is unable to sustain his international standing. Let her pause and reflect on her own. Rajiv Gandhi8217;s legacy is at stake.

The writer is a senior defence analyst

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