So many roads from Lal Masjid

The military operation has only sharpened the choices before Pakistani state and society

The military operation against the Lal Masjid extremists is over. But most Pakistanis are worried about its fallout. Indeed, a post-mortem reveals disturbing fissures in Pakistani state and society with far-reaching consequences.

One, there is a split among those Pakistanis who say 8220;they had it coming8221;, that the writ of the state must be enforced at all costs, that religious extremism is a curse, and those who nevertheless insist that the 8220;militants should have been given safe passage in order to save the lives of women and children8221;. Naturally, the latter include mullahs and conservatives of all shades. But anti-Musharraf politicians are also trying to exploit the situation. The only divergent voice is that of Benazir Bhutto. She agrees that the 8220;operation8221; was necessary but has cunningly qualified it by adding that religious extremism is a consequence of army rule and only civilian supremacy in a democracy can counter it effectively.

Two, the mainstream vernacular media, print and electronic, has been more swayed by the Islamists than the government. This is because the sentiments of most middle-class reporters, news editors and television anchors are typically anti-army, anti-Musharraf, anti-West, and anti-America. The objective effect of this is the consolidation of emotional positions in the media by default. Since pro-establishment, commercial-minded owners are unable or unwilling to educate their staffers in the larger, long-term, rational 8220;national interest8221;, this independent media-bias could become a destabilising factor in the national polity.

Three, the Musharraf-military-PML alliance is a net loser in this situation. Many Pakistanis accuse it of scripting the prolonged drama to divert attention from the multiple crises facing it and then losing control of the play when the actors rebelled, compelling it to hastily draw the curtain. Others believe it arrogantly backtracked on a last-ditch solution stitched by PML stalwarts Chaudhry Shujaat/Ijaz ul Haq and Maulana Rashid Ghazi. The net result is mullah outrage and conservative alienation across the country. If this protest becomes widespread and turns violent, the government might be compelled to clamp martial law. At any rate, with 8220;lib-labs8221;, NGOs and civil-society types opposed to military rule, and others rooting for the PPP, the fortunes of the ruling Muslim League are likely to dim in the run-up to general elections, thereby significantly thwarting General Musharraf8217;s political ambitions.

Four, the bloody conclusion to the Lal Masjid affair has only served to bring the government8217;s simmering political troubles into sharper focus rather than make them go away. The Supreme Court8217;s decision on the fate of the CJP is expected next week. In this anti-government mood of the country, if the judges are inclined to bend with the popular wind instead of standing with the government, a gaping hole could appear in Musharraf8217;s plans to be re-elected president by the present assemblies, appoint a pro-PML caretaker government that would facilitate the ruling party in the general elections, and continue to wear his army uniform for the next five years.

Five, there may be a long-term silver lining in the Lal Masjid showdown if the right conclusions are drawn by the military establishment. The most significant conclusion is that the time has come to disband the military-mullah alliance 8212; which has been the pet project of the establishment since the 1980s 8212; for good. This is a natural consequence of the post-Cold War world and Pakistan8217;s place in it after 9/11. Islamabad now has the bomb on the shelf instead of in the basement. Its armed forces have been modernised and replenished. Its economy is finally on the mend. It needs peace in the region, especially with India, to sustain these developments. Therefore it has no need for jihadis or radical Islamists to further its security agendas. On the contrary, they have now become part of the problem instead of the solution, as demonstrated by their desperate attempts to derail the peace dialogue with India, to assassinate General Musharraf, to Talibanise the frontier regions, provoke American retaliation, and to enforce their narrow self-serving brand of shariah in the federal capital by vigilante action.

Six, this paradigm shift cannot be fully accomplished by the establishment simply by allying with a failing PML. The PML has shown itself to be a drag on General Musharraf8217;s agenda for enlightened moderation. At every turning point, its leaders have sought alliances with the mullahs instead of spurning them. The built-in contradiction between Musharraf8217;s outlook and that of his main political partner needs to be resolved. This suggests the necessity of a transitional alliance of the new military establishment with more progressive and secular elements.

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Seven, the tide of political and religious extremism cannot be turned back solely by our weak, divided and ill-disciplined political parties without the active support of the military. Indeed, 8220;undiluted8221; civilian democracy without military backing would be a recipe for anarchy just as military supremacy with a weak civilian consensus is leading to political gridlock. Instead, an enlightened and moderate politico-military alliance is required immediately in the short term to stem the growth of religious radicalism in the same manner in which a conservative and immoderate politico-military alliance was cobbled to start the process of Islamisation in the 1980s.

The writer is editor, 8216;Daily Times8217; and 8216;The Friday Times8217;, Lahore