Rocca for restraint

US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca would, no doubt, speak to the government in New Delhi and advise restraint against any escal...

US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca would, no doubt, speak to the government in New Delhi and advise restraint against any escalation by India on the borders. However, this is a welcome opportunity for the government to brief the lady in some detail about the ground situation that remains a cause of concern to policy-makers in Washington. The global war against terrorism has myriad dimensions. But the American and Indian goals in this war converge. The US war was able to achieve substantive success as long as it was conducted in Afghanistan. But it now appears to be getting stymied largely because of the lack of sincerity in co-operation it receives from Islamabad. India in its own interest would exercise restraint, at least up to a point. But the crux of the matter is whether Pakistan delivers on its promises? In dealing with the situation Washington must recognise that both the US and India are fighting the same war even if the specifics of the battles and tactics of dealing with them are different. They must co-ordinate their strategy and policies.

Eight months after the terrorist strikes on the US, the scorecard indicates that the Taliban have been dismantled and Al-Qaeda dispersed. But 90 per cent of the top Al-Qaeda leaders remain at large and along with their cadres are clearly inside Pakistan, often moving with impunity to and from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The US is misreading the nature and reasons of the opposition to Musharraf which essentially comes from the erosion of his credibility to deliver on his promises of good governance. Half-hearted counter-terrorist measures have only encouraged the jehadi entities to escalate terrorism as the killings in Islamabad and Karachi demonstrated. More important, Washington must recognise that Pakistan especially its army and the ISI is part of the problem rather than the solution. It, therefore, needs to craft a policy that takes into account the harsh realities where co-operation beyond dismantling the Taliban would not be possible without ripping open the innards of Islamabad8217;s favoured instrument of state policy, the jehadi machine itself, through concerted, co-ordinated measures.

Five months after the jehadi attack on the Lok Sabha and four months after Musharraf8217;s soothing speech delivered under the combined India-US pressure, the scorecard is even less satisfactory. The commando in Musharraf repeatedly claims that the military mobilisation is actually hurting India and its army more, although his government plans to use that as an excuse to increase defence budget next month. He even rattled the nuclear sabre to bolster his referendum campaign. The list of 20, which was offered as face-saving opening negotiating chip has lost all meaning. The bulk of the 2,000 plus radicals and jehadis arrested after the January speech have been released. Above all, the incidence of terrorism in J038;K during the months since then has been distinctly higher than in the winter months during the previous years. The number of terrorist training camps and launch pads in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have been increasing and so is the possibility of Al-Qaeda moving in. India8217;s options would keep narrowing if the US were unable to pressurise Islamabad to reverse terrorism quickly, firmly and permanently.