Play it again, Sam

Richard Nixonacirc;euro;trade;s penchant for taped conversations may have spelt the end of his presidency amidst the stench of the Watergate scandal, but there is no denying that, some two decades later, they provide fascinating glimpses into the mind of a US president. The man, sometimes described as Tricky Dick8217;, and from whom few Americans would have bought a used car, was nevertheless open to ambitious, even daring, foreign policy manoeuvres crafted by the redoubtable Henry Kissinger, the then US secretary of state. After all, it was during the Nixon presidency that the US did the seemingly unthinkable 8212; make peace with its intractable foe, the People8217;s Republic of China under Chairman Mao. It was a historic shift made possible by a foreign policy which disdained moral arguments in favour of pragmatism and had the prescience to perceive China as a sleeping giant on the world stage.

Those were the days when the US regarded Pakistan, no matter how authoritarian and despicable its regimes were, as a vital bulwark against theUSSR8217;s expansionism in Afghanistan. Pakistan had other uses too. As a file maintained by its then president, Yahya Khan, and cited in these columns last week, revealed, Pakistan played a crucial role in expediting US-China detente 8212; it was a dual responsibility of being both cover and conduit. Inevitably, therefore, given the recurring hostilities between China and Pakistan vis-a-vis this country and India8217;s own ties with the USSR, the American administration under Nixon came to regard this country with a great measure of suspicion, if not antipathy. The evidence provided by the Nixon tapes only underlines how deep this suspicion indeed was during a period that saw the Bangladesh war break out on the subcontinent and Pakistan lose its eastern flank.

It was generally understood that if India waged war on Pakistan, the US would come to its aid. But history showed this to be an empty promise. The Pakistanis had certainly hoped for concrete military support from their mighty friend during the grueling moments of an encounter now termed the Bangladesh war of liberation, but nothing emerged. Kissinger may have warned Mrs Gandhi of the fatal consequences of getting involved in the Bangladesh cause, Nixon may have sent in the aircraft carrier Enterprise8217; for exercises in the Bay of Bengal in December 1971, just before the Niazi surrender in Dacca, but in actual terms there was no open declaration of hostilities between India and the USA at this critical juncture. What was more interesting was China8217;s behaviour 8212; it scrupulously kept out of a war raging in its backyard. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of that period, and something that those who are constantly raising the China bogey in this country must mull over. As for the Nixon tapes, theyshould be viewed as interesting evidence of the many vicissitudes that have marked Indo-US relations. History lessons are always useful, especially as both countries work towards a new threshold of engagement.