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Journalism of Courage
The buzz in Kashmir is that people and leaders there are tired of conflict and would like to be engaged, the rash of terrorist attacks notwithstanding. If Prime Minister Manmohan Singh waits for the Monsoon Session of Parliament to be over before attending to the New Delhi-Srinagar track, the September meeting with General Musharraf in New York will reflect this noticeable gap.
The peace process with Pakistan is curiously poised. More has been done to bring the people of the two countries together since the Islamabad Declaration of January 6, 2004, than ever in the history of the two nations. And, yet, there is a spurt in militant attacks from Ayodhya to Kashmir. The extended engagement in the Gurez valley was a result of one of the largest infiltrations across the LoC.
There are two broad schools of thought in New Delhi on militancy which appear to be coming from across the border. Proponents of both points of view accept that the ceasefire across the LoC is holding. On that count, the central authority in Pakistan is abiding by the understanding. But the two schools differ on the sources of the cross-border militancy. One believes the militancy is freelance in nature and that Musharraf has no control over these residual jehadis. The more pragmatic school is convinced that the 8220;residue8221; is actually quite substantial and the tap for this militant reservoir is controlled by Islamabad.
The telephone conversation Musharraf had with Manmohan Singh earlier this week has helped to keep the process on track. Western diplomats in Islamabad believe the Corps Commanders are entirely on Musharraf8217;s wavelength. But are elements in, say, the ISI at the level of colonels and below, having difficulty withdrawing protection to jehadis?
There is some appreciation of Musharraf8217;s difficulties. At least four of his divisions are deployed in the tribal areas, creating unbelievable anger and resentment. This is in addition to the two states ruled by Islamist parties. The precariousness of the situation in Baluchistan has to be learnt from the Iranian internal security apparatus, keenly observing the scene from across the border. This bureaucracy has a realistic, day-to-day perspective on developments here.
Musharraf made a U-turn post 9/11 to protect his state, the nuclear arsenal and, by taking advantage of the global situation, to attempt Turkey like Kemalism in a country placed on the Islamic slope for two decades. He probably did not realise he would run into such rough weather with his jehadis. If Afghanistan could be stabilised, causing the Americans to depart, there would be an option to resume the compact with Islamists. But that is not happening. The US is in the region for the long haul. Additionally, the new strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington has conclusively de-hyphenated New Delhi and Islamabad in the US framework.
In other words, Musharraf is having to cope with multiple pressures. So what options can he exercise? Clearly, there will a temptation among some of the advisers to reach out to China, Russia, Uzbekistan 8212; centres that are suspicious of US plans in the region. But this is more of wishful thinking than an option. You can run in all directions when someone frightful approaches you but you cannot move when that someone already has you by the scruff of the neck.
The only real option for Pakistan is to accelerate the peace process, shunning whatever militancy there is in the camps. Pakistan must gamble on the burgeoning constituency for peace. This silent majority can outflank the extremists who, by association with the London bombers, have caused such embarrassment to Pakistan and the Muslim diaspora.
But Musharraf needs India to put further momentum into the peace process. India must create conditions in Kashmir which promise progress 8212; the sort of progress which the Pakistan president can use to convince his Islamists on the value of treading such a path.
Write to saeednaqviexpressindia.com
