Periscope on Pakistan

Back to wall, Army kicked hard to winThe Nation: The dismissal of the Sharif government is a shocking and sad finale to the ugly debate d...

Back to wall, Army kicked hard to win

The Nation: The dismissal of the Sharif government is a shocking and sad finale to the ugly debate doing the rounds ever since the decision to call it a day in Kargil after the Washington Declaration of July 48230; The pot was on the boil and would soon be boiling over. First, the whole gameplan to sack General Musharraf during his absence from the country underscored its essentially amateurish character together with a certain lack of confidence in its success on the part of the authors. Second: The complete, almost incredible, loss of nearly 24 crucial hours between the return of the PM and the ISI Chief from the UAE and the activation of the Sack Musharraf operation.

What had the PM and the DG ISI been doing during this long interval? Did they realise that no such plan call it a conspiracy, if you will had the slimmest chance of success without the help of the GHQ and Commander X Corps? To all outward appearances nothing of that kind even crossed their mind.Hence the miserable flop. For Lt Gen Ziauddin, DG, ISI, it must be the greatest faux pax of his service career not to have a clue about the Great Game under way in his own backyard. It was absolutely clear that neither the PM nor the DG ISI had the foggiest idea about what would be in store for them until they both crashed. What kind of ISI do we have if it can8217;t see the beam in its own eye while claiming to see the mole in the others? Having been driven to the wall, the Army has kicked hard to win. The question is: What next? What chance can democracy have in a country where a party with a two-thirds majority in the House fails to complete its term. Furthermore, what will be the future role of the Army which can topple an elected government without much ado.

Sharif threw all caution to the winds

The Nation : The Army knew why General Jehangir Karamat was made to go he had talked publicly about a national security council. The Army also knew why Admiral Bukhari resigned a few days back he mayhave been disappointed at not being selected for the job of Chief JCSC. But no reason for sacking General Musharraf was given. It could have been why his colleagues at the GHQ refused to accept General Ziauddin, as his replacement8230; The Army high command must have really been desperate to defy the Prime Minister this time, as against its unhappy acquiescence to General Karamat8217;s ouster, even though it knew that the international community would disapprove of it and its move would be challenged in the courts.

The Army must have also known that its move would do grievous harm to the process of democracy in the country. Was this realisation at the back of General Musharraf8217;s apparent unwillingness to commit himself to a specific course? This is not clear. But while one looks at this uncertain future, it would only be logical to look at the circumstances that brought us to such a pass. It was being hoped that the PML government, led by Mian Nawaz Sharif, having received an unprecedented majority, would use itsheavy mandate not only to strengthen the roots of democracy but would also take the country out of the economic mess. But Mian Sahib took democracy to mean silencing of all dissent within his own party and removal of all checks and balances on his own and his party8217;s rule.

The past history of the Army8217;s role in politics was overlooked. The US8217;s implied warning to the Army not to overstep the limits of the Constitution, was deemed to be a protective armour and Sahib threw all caution to the winds. It was wrong but that does not mean that one wrong justifies another wrong. Another wrong having already been committed, may we now urge caution on the army8217;s part. A great responsibility rests on its shoulders to put the country back on its rails. And for that, elections and a representative government as soon as possible are essential prerequisites.